Public diplomacy and the Translation Office (Tercüme Odası) in the Ottoman Empire (1839-1876) by Kamay, Berna
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THE TRANSLATION OFFICE (TERCÜME ODASI) 
IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1839-1876) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Master’s Thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
BERNA KAMAY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY 
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY 
ANKARA 
 
 
September 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THE TRANSLATION OFFICE (TERCÜME ODASI) 
IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1839-1876) 
 
 
Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences 
of 
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University 
 
 
by 
BERNA KAMAY 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
 
in 
 
 
THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY 
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY 
ANKARA 
 
 
 
September 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope 
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in History. 
 
 
 
-------------------------- 
Asst. Prof. Akif Kireçci 
Thesis Supervisor 
 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope 
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in History. 
 
 
 
-------------------------- 
Asst. Prof. Oktay Özel 
Examining Committee Member 
 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope 
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in History. 
 
 
 
-------------------------- 
Prof. Mehmet Öz 
Examining Committee Member 
 
 
 
Approved by the Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences. 
 
 
 
-------------------------- 
Prof. Dr. Erdal Erel 
Director 
 
 
iii 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THE TRANSLATION OFFICE 
(TERCÜME ODASI ) IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1839-1876) 
        Kamay, Berna 
M.A., Department of History, Bilkent University 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Mehmet Akif Kireçci 
 
December 2012 
 
 
This study aims to situate the role of the public diplomacy conducted by the Foreign 
Ministry during the intensified foreign diplomacy of the 19th century Ottoman 
Empire. By looking at the archival documents of the Translation Office (Tercüme 
Odası) within the Foreign Ministry, this thesis shows how foreign newspapers 
became the tools of implementing public diplomacy. After discussing the 
transformation of the office of the Reis-ül Küttab to Foreign Ministry in correlation 
with the development and changing nature of Ottoman foreign affairs, the study 
focuses on the importance of the newly emerging bureaucratic system and the crucial 
role the new style bureaucrats played in the transformation of the Empire. The major 
focus of this study is on the role of the intelligence network between the Ottoman 
embassies, the Translation Office and the Foreign Ministry in conducting the public 
diplomacy through the monitoring of European newspapers. Ottoman diplomats and 
iv 
 
agents proved competent in their effort to elevate their profession and integrate the 
Ottoman diplomacy into the European system by using new diplomatic tools such as 
public diplomacy. 
 
Keywords: Public Diplomacy, Ottoman Public Diplomacy, Foreign Ministry, 
Translation Office (Tercüme Odası), Tanzimat Period, Public Opinion, European 
Newspapers, Bureaucratic State. 
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ÖZET 
OSMANLI DEVLETİ’NDE KAMU DİPLOMASİSİ VE ÇEVİRİ 
ODASI (TERCÜME ODASI) (1839-1876) 
Kamay, Berna 
Master, Tarih Bölümü, Bilkent Üniversitesi 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Mehmet Akif Kireçci 
 
Aralık 2012 
 
 
Bu çalışma, 19. yüzyıl Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun yoğun dış diplomasisinde 
Hariciye Nezareti tarafından yürütülen kamu diplomasisinin önemini ortaya 
koymaktadır. Bu çalışma, Tercüme Odası arşiv kaynaklarına dayanarak, yabancı 
gazetelerin kamu diplomasisinin yürütülmesinde nasıl araç olduklarını göstermiştir. 
Reisülküttab ofisinin Hariciye Nezaretine dönüşümünü Osmanlı dış diplomasisinin 
gelişimi ve değişen doğasıyla ilişkilendirerek anlattıktan sonra, bu çalışma yeni 
ortaya çıkan bürokratik sistemin ve yeni tip Osmanlı bürokratlarının Osmanlı 
İmparatorluğu’nun dönüşümünde  oynadıkları önemli rol üzerine odaklanmıştır. Bu 
çalışmanın ana odak noktası Osmanlı elçilikleri, Tercüme Odası ve Hariciye Nezareti 
arasındaki haberleşme teşkilatının Avrupa gazeteleri aracılığıyla kamu diplomasisi 
yürütmekteki önemi üzerindedir. Osmanlı diplomatları ve temsilcileri  mesleklerinde 
yükselmede ve kamu diplomasisi gibi yeni diplomatic araçlar kullanarak Osmanlı 
diplomasisini Avrupa sistemine entegre etmede başarılı olduklarını kanıtlamışlardır. 
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Anahtar Kelimeler: Kamu Diplomasisi, Osmanlı Kamu Diplomasisi, Çeviri Odası 
(Tercüme Odası), Tanzimat Dönemi, Kamuoyu, Avrupa Gazeteleri, Bürokratik 
Devlet. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Subject 
 
  Recent revisions to the traditional studies of the decline of the Ottoman 
Empire in the 19
th
 century have turned previous explanations upside down. For 
generations, Ottoman period has been assessed as if the decline of the Empire was 
the expected path for the Ottoman Empire. However, recent literature on the 19
th
 
century transformation that has evaluated the attempts made by the Ottoman 
authorities to keep the Ottoman Empire intact suggests new interpretations regarding 
the bureaucratic reform.
1
 The bureaucratic reform became the pinnacle of Ottoman 
modernization which enabled the Ottoman Empire to deal with its inner problems 
more efficiently and to adapt itself to the modern European institutions & the 
political system. 
 The conduct of foreign diplomacy was the main focus intended to integrate 
the Ottoman Empire into European system and it was correlated closely with the 
                                                        
   1 Carter Findley, “The Legacy of Tradition to Reform: Origins of Ottoman Foreign Ministry,” 
IJMES, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, Oct., 1970), p. 334. 
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developments in the bureaucratic reforms.
2
 Among all sections of the Sublime Porte 
(Bab-ı Ali), the Foreign Ministry (Hariciye Nezareti) became the most important 
institution to come into intense contact with Europe in the reform period. The 
increasing volume of official assignments required highly skilled bureaucrats who in 
time were trained from the cadre of the Foreign Ministry. Becoming competent in 
diplomacy and economics, these bureaucrats emerged as prominent figures (Reshid 
Pasha, Âlî Pasha, Fuad Pasha, among others) of the administration system during the 
19
th
 century. “Devoted exclusively to the secular interests of the state and free from 
formalism and the bonds of tradition,” they became the leading actors of the 
bureaucratic reform.
3
  
A very critical section of the Foreign Ministry was the Translation Office 
(Tercüme Odası), which served as a place to train future statesmen. From the 
beginning of the reform period, officials of the Translation Office had the chance to 
get to know the modern world & Europe. Via the Ottoman embassies and diplomatic 
offices abroad, the Translation Office became the channel of the intelligence network 
to provide information to the attention of the Foreign Ministry and reinforced 
initiatives for Ottoman reforms.
4
 Furthermore, knowledge of foreign languages put 
the Translation Office officials in superior position, vis-a-vis other echelons of both 
the bureaucratic class and society.
5
 Knowledge of French, in particular, was 
                                                        
   2 Roderic Davison, “Environmental and Foreign Contributions: Turkey,” in Political Modernization 
in Japan and Turkey, ed. by Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (Princeton; Princeton 
University Press, 1964), p. 104. 
   3 Halil Inalcık, “The Nature of Traditional Society: Turkey,” in Political Modernization in Japan 
and Turkey, ed. by Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 
1964), p. 55. 
   4 Paul Dumont, “ Tanzimat Dönemi, (1839–1878),”  in Robert Mantran, Osmanlı Imparatorluğu 
Tarihi II; Duraklamadan Yıkılışa, trans. By Server Tanilli (Istanbul; Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür 
Yayınları, 2010), p. 73. 
   5 Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought; A Study in the Modernization Of Turkish 
Political Ideas (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 121. 
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considered as the gate to Western norms and systems, which served as a tool to 
observe and convey changes in Europe.
6
 
The integration of the Ottoman Empire into the European system was 
considered by its diplomats to be the inevitable result of intensified foreign relations, 
along with “the legitimate right to existence as a recognized member of the Concert 
of Europe.”7 The efforts assert a role for the Ottoman Empire in the European 
politics was in part an image problem that the Ottoman Empire had been unable to 
resolve. Existing prejudices among Europeans, including the tendency to regard the 
Ottoman Empire as “backward,” “oppressive” and “underdeveloped” had to be 
reversed, and the changed nature of the modern Ottoman Empire should be 
demonstrated to Europeans.
8
 For both internal administration and foreign relations 
maintained abroad, officials of the Sublime Porte had to justify their actions and 
prove that the power of the Empire was intact. The nature of European relations with 
the Ottoman Empire changed in the 19
th
 century, owing to the colonial aspirations of 
Europe over the Ottoman territories, the minority problems and separatist tendencies 
that caused problems in the provinces. The European powers manipulated these 
issues to justify their interventions into the internal affairs of the Empire. Therefore, 
the Ottoman Empire faced challenge of explaining itself to Europe as it attempted to 
cope with its internal problems.  
The Sublime Porte had sufficient means to assert itself through public 
diplomacy; as Deringil argues, “the Ottoman State was better administered and more 
                                                        
   6 Roderic Davison, “The French Language as a Vehicle for Ottoman Reform in the 19th Century,” in 
Nineteenth Century Ottoman Diplomacy and Reforms  (Istanbul; the Isis Press, 1997), pp. 433-434. 
   7 Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the 
Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909 (London-New York; I.B.Tauris, 1998), p.9. 
   8 Roderic Davison, “Ottoman Public Relations in the 19th Century: How the Sublime Porte Tried to 
Influence European Public Opinion,” in Nineteenth Century Ottoman Diplomacy and Reforms 
(Istanbul; the Isis Press, 1997 ),  p.351. 
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powerful after the reforms of the mid-19
th
 century than in the late 18
th
 century.”9 The 
newly formed Ottoman bureaucracy developed efficient ways to reach the modern 
institutions of Europe. On the other hand, the Foreign Ministry manipulated the tools 
of public diplomacy to maintain stable foreign relation with Europe. 
Foreign public diplomacy was conducted between the Ottoman embassies, 
the Translation Office and the higher authorities of the Foreign Ministry. Diplomats 
in the Ottoman embassies were just the servants applying the orders of the Foreign 
Ministry. Though they also involved in negotiations apart from the observing and 
making advocacy on the policies, these diplomats abroad mostly acted under the 
supervision of the Foreign Ministry of the Sublime Porte.
10
 The Translation Office 
was the main channel through which information that was addressed to the Foreign 
Ministry and the Sublime Porte was circulated. Relevant documents written in 
foreign languages were translated and stored in the archives of Translation Office in 
advance of going to the higher offices. The embassies and the Translation Office 
were intertwined. The career of a successful bureaucrat within the Foreign Ministry 
used to start at the Translation Office. Later, he was sent to embassy posts in Europe 
to gain experience in diplomatic affairs. The utmost level of his career ended up with 
the higher positions in the Ottoman bureaucracy.
11
 
The aim of this thesis is to situate the role and importance of public 
diplomacy adopted by the Ottoman Foreign Ministry in the maintenance of Ottoman 
foreign policy during the 19
th
 century. I specifically focus on the efforts of Ottoman 
diplomats (often unidentified names) to monitor and influence foreign newspapers. I 
                                                        
   9 Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the 
Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909, p. 9. 
  10 Davison, “Ottoman Public Relations in the 19th Century: How the Sublime Porte Tried to influence 
European Public Opinion,” p. 352. 
    11 Carter Findley, Civil Officialdom  (Princeton-New Jersey; Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 
280. 
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suggest that the Ottoman statesmen and the agents/channels of the Foreign Ministry 
exerted how the Sublime Porte bureaucracy developed modern methods for 
conducting public diplomacy in Europe. Tracing my materials from the archival 
documents of the Translation Office, I also point out that most of the 
correspondences concerning the foreign newspapers directly addressed the Foreign 
Ministry. Though, they first came to the Translation Office. The newspapers were 
not the only ones sent to be translated, but there was an interesting fact that all the 
correspondences written by the Ottoman officials in the embassies were also 
composed in French. That was the main reason why these reports and 
correspondences first came to the Translation Office. 
By the early periods of the 19
th
 century, the officials of the Ottoman Empire 
realized the need to find ways to keep the empire intact, as years of exhaustive wars 
and other incidents threatened the integrity of the Empire. The urgent calls for 
change stemmed from the recognition of the internal problems of the Empire, as well 
as the foreign intervention into its domestic affairs. As a result, the order and 
harmony of the society was seen at stake, and they sought measures to remedy the 
problem. However, although “Tanzimat rhetoric and political terminology remained 
deeply embedded in the traditional Ottoman imagination of a perfect order and 
society,” the ways to ensure that order changed direction.12 In the pre-modern period, 
violation of the established system was followed by an uprising that was suppressed. 
In the Tanzimat modernization period, maintenance of the state system after 
violation and uprising resulted in the establishment of a new order.
13
 Reform 
attempts were considered by the officials of the Sublime Porte as likely to be 
                                                        
   12 Maurus Reinskowski, “The State’s Security and the Subject’s Prosperity: Notions of Order in 
Ottoman Bureaucratic Correspondence (19th Century)” in Hakan Karateke and Maurus Reinkowski, 
ed.; Legitimizing the Order; the Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power  (Leiden-Boston; Brill, 2005), p. 
204. 
   13 Ibid, pp. 205-209. 
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effective and so undertaken mainly within the military and administrative systems. 
Unfortunately, the results were not sufficient to save the situation. According to 
Davison, the lack of enough reform attempts resulted in the emergence of new 
diplomatic policies.
14
 The establishment of a Foreign Ministry under control of the 
Sublime Porte became the best way to ensure a diplomacy that would meet the 
requirements of the time and compete with the powers of Europe. To achieve that, 
the officials in the Ottoman Empire organized an intelligence network between the 
Sublime Porte, other parts of the Empire and Ottoman embassies to follow Europe. 
Within this intelligence network, the best instrument to understand Europe was the 
“foreign newspapers.” And so, following up the foreign newspapers therefore 
became an important tool in shaping and directing the public diplomacy of the 
Foreign Ministry. 
Ottoman officials, especially the ones who worked in the Foreign Ministry 
used the tools of public diplomacy along with the help of other bureaucratic 
institutions. Through these reform attempts the Ottoman bureaucracy attuned 
themselves at the same time to a modern diplomacy system. In that respect, the 
Translation Office of the Foreign Ministry provided the most fertile atmosphere for 
training the future statesmen that would be the reform makers in the future. It became 
instrumental in transferring the news crucial to Ottoman politics from foreign 
newspapers and, via embassy correspondences, thus helping the Foreign Ministry to 
maintain more stable diplomacy. 
By the 19th century, the Translation Office of the Imperial Council had been 
institutionalized as part of the newly forming bureaucratic apparatus. In the previous 
centuries, the dragomans maintained their missions more or less individually, not 
                                                        
   14 Roderic Davison, “The Westernization of Ottoman Diplomacy in the 19th Century,” in Nineteenth 
Century Ottoman Diplomacy and Reforms (Istanbul; the Isis Press, 1999), p. 317. 
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depending on regular salary or strict written rules. With the establishment of the 
Translation Office under the Foreign Ministry (Hariciye Nezareti) in 1835, the 
dragomans became officials in the highly centralized bureaucratic system of the 
Sublime Porte (Bab-ı Alî). Henceforward, each task was completed in accordance 
with the regulations of an established organization.  
The main innovation of the newly formed Translation Office was the use of 
Muslim officers rather than non-Muslim dragomans or Greek translators. Many of 
the new Muslim officials later moved of the office to become prominent statesmen of 
the Tanzimat bureaucracy. Prior to the 19
th
 century, the Ottoman administrators did 
not find any need to manage the training in foreign affairs for its officials, simply 
organizing them as an office of the Foreign Ministry. After the establishment of the 
Translation Office, however, official state policy led to a slow transfer of duties so 
that the Ottoman Empire would cease relying on non-Muslim subjects as it began to 
train able and well-educated Muslim officers to take their place. 
In the meantime, the foreign diplomacy of the Ottoman Empire changed in 
nature and in the way how it was conducted. During the pre-modern times, Ottoman 
diplomacy was more or less based on the will of the Sultan and realized by the 
irregular sending of the temporary ambassadors as fevkalade elçi to Europe. While 
the European powers already established their permanent embassies all around 
Europe and the Ottoman Empire; the transition from the unilateral to reciprocal 
Ottoman diplomacy was only gained after the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699), which 
forced Ottomans to alter their traditional perspective of diplomacy. By the end of the 
18
th
 century, the initiatives of Selim III (r.1789–1807) resulted with the foundation of 
the permanent embassies. These embassies and the consulates were crucial attempts 
for commencing good contacts with European powers. They “represented the Empire 
8 
 
to Europe. They also represented Europe to the Ottomans by collecting information 
about the countries where they served.”15 
 In that respect, public diplomacy as part of the flow of that information 
became an important tool of the 19
th
 century Ottoman diplomacy. Though, 
terminologically it was the product of the Cold War period, public diplomacy was 
actually used before. Applied mostly on the base of “monologue, dialogue and 
collaboration”16 in its modern usage, the public diplomacy of the Ottoman Empire 
rather used vigilance, advice and negotiation as Davison observed.
17
 According to 
Davison, the 19
th
 century Ottoman foreign diplomacy was established on the base of 
certain policies. The very basic one was the efforts of establishing balance with the 
European powers and the second, in relation with the former one, was the policy to 
evade from attending the international conferences. Both of these strategies were 
stemmed from the aim of gaining time against the European powers and to prevent to 
some extent their motives of intervention. Other protocols like visit of a Sultan to 
Europe (Sultan Abdülaziz Han, r.1861–1876) or exhibitions; etc were all about 
establishing and maintaining a good image of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. Yet 
there was another quite powerful tool to the Foreign Ministry used as an excuse to 
create a sphere for itself in the international arena; the public opinion and press.
18
  
The Hatt-ı Sharif (Tanzimat Fermanı) of 1839 and Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856 
(Islahat Fermanı) brought certain equalities and secular rights to tebaa and officials 
                                                        
    15 Carter Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, Modernity, (New Haven-London; Yale University 
Press, 2010), p. 34; and also look Thomas Naff, “Reform and Conduct of the Ottoman Diplomacy in 
the Reign of Selim III, 1789–1807,” JAOS, Vol.83, No.3  (Aug.-Sep., 1963). 
   16 Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault, “Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: 
The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy,” American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.616 
(Mar.2008). 
   17 See; Roderic Davison, “Vienna as a Major Ottoman Diplomatic Post in the 19th century,” in 
Nineteenth Century Ottoman Diplomacy and Press (Istanbul; the Isis Press, 1997). 
    18 For the diplomacy methods of the 19th century Ottoman Empire see; Roderic Davison, “The 
Westernization of the Ottoman Diplomacy in the 19th Century,” in Nineteenth Century Ottoman 
Diplomacy and Reforms. 
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of the Ottoman Empire. Along with the Crimean War (1854), the Ottoman Empire 
became allied itself with the two most powerful European powers of the time; France 
and England. In that respect, the Ottoman Empire adapted itself more or less as a 
secular monarchy resembling the European powers for the methods of diplomacy it 
conducted in the international arena.
19
 These methods above were required to be 
applied. The use of press and the inspection over the public opinion became one of 
the most important responsibilities of the Ottoman embassies and agents abroad. The 
control of and influence over the foreign newspapers in Europe helped the Ottoman 
statesmen to attune their policy more easily to the policies of European powers. 
Ottoman Empire’s interest in influencing the public opinion increased with 
the outbreak of the Crimean War; dates of some archival documents assert that there 
were instances where the agents of the Foreign Ministry tried to control the 
information flow about the Ottoman Empire before that time, though.
20
 The use of 
foreign press became the most useful tool to implement the public diplomacy of the 
Foreign Ministry and to control the pulse of the public opinion in Europe. All these 
attempts of public diplomacy were taken with the aim of providing “damage control” 
vis-a vis “crisis management”21 of the foreign diplomacy.  
In light of these developments, the first chapter evaluates the change of the 
nature of the Ottoman diplomacy from using the pre-modern methods to the 19
th
 
century modern tools, including public diplomacy. In correlating with that 
transformation, the conduct of the foreign affairs of the Ottoman administrative 
system through the transfer of Reis-ül Küttab ( Chief Scribe) of Nişancı (Chancery) 
before the 18
th
 century to the Reis-ül Küttab as the servant of the Grand Vizier in the 
                                                        
    19 Ibid, p. 321. 
    20 For instance; BOA, TO. 30/36 ( 14.7.1847), 408/29 (20.10.1847),  408/31 (30.10.1847). 
    21 Davison, “Ottoman Public Relations in the 19th Century: How the Sublime Porte Tried to 
Influence European Public Opinion,” p. 358. 
10 
 
Sublime Porte of the 18
th
 century is examined by taking into account the changes 
occurred in the structure and in the division of responsibilities. Then I show a picture 
of the substantial transformation the Translation Office underwent. I also highlight 
the shift in the importance of the career line from Amedi Kalemi to Tercüme Odası. 
Although I briefly discuss modern day terminology of the public diplomacy, 
my study inspires in large part, on the three layers approach 
(vigilance,advice/advocacy, negotiation) to public diplomacy suggested earlier by 
Davison.
22
As the main agents of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, the important 
function of the Ottoman embassies is briefly addressed yet the weight was put more 
on the Translation Office. Being the first center of training for Ottoman bureaucrats, 
the Translation Office was the nascent place of the entire Foreign Ministry cadre. 
The officials working there shared the same mindset with their superiors and they 
became the channels for the flow of information to the Foreign Ministry after the 
effort of the embassy agents. 
 According to Davison, in the wake of reform attempts many requirements of 
the public diplomacy, contrary to expectations, were already realized in the Ottoman 
Empire. The transformation of the administrative system, the steps taken to enhance 
the economy, the changes made to education and the practice of law were already 
achieved by 1835 as part of the efforts to resolve internal problems.
23
 However, 
change continued after that date, as more policies were adopted in alignment with 
Europe and get close to its modern state system. Hence the means of modern public 
diplomacy were sought as a supplement to diplomatic relations. In that respect, the 
best tool became foreign newspapers. According to Naff, control of the public 
opinion, as a part of Ottoman public diplomacy, was “an indication of the changes 
                                                        
   22 See Roderic Davison, “Vienna as a Major Ottoman Diplomatic Post in the Nineteenth Century”. 
   23 Davison, “Ottoman Public Relations in the 19th Century,” p. 351. 
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that were taking place, and a harbinger of changes that were on the way.”24 The 
nascent Foreign Ministry functioning at the heart of the Sublime Porte followed that 
policy in two steps, first monitoring and then controlling information distributed in 
the foreign newspapers. 
 In the second chapter, I examine the monitoring of foreign newspapers 
conducted by the members of the Foreign Ministry. The Ottoman bureaucrats, aided 
by their embassy based intelligence network, monitored each newspaper for topics 
relevant to the inner problems of the Ottoman Empire or to the European politics that 
attracted the attention of the Sublime Porte. In the pre-modern era, the intelligence 
network consisted of diplomats who regularly went to and returned from Europe. 
They reported in vigilance on events taking place in Europe, provided their own 
advocacy and conducted negotiations on behalf of the Ottoman Empire. In the 19
th
 
century, though, observing European public opinion about the Ottoman Empire 
became the regularly established policy of the Foreign Ministry.
25
 The flow of 
information to Istanbul via the intelligence network established in Europe, meant 
Ottoman statesmen were informed about everything happening in Europe, including 
negative news that would hurt the interests of the Empire. I explain why the Foreign 
Ministry chose monitoring foreign newspapers. Accordingly, I demonstrate the 
motives behind certain European press that led them to publish articles & news in 
accordance with the European politics of the time. Based on the aforementioned 
policies of monitoring, I set forth the political nature of these strategies, examining 
the public diplomacy of the Foreign Ministry. Lastly, I discuss the role of the 
Translation Office in dispersing and collecting certain newspaper clippings, and the 
                                                        
   24 Thomas Naff, “Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy in the Reign of Selim III, 1789–
1807,” p. 311. 
   25 Davison, “Ottoman Public Relations in the 19th Century,” p. 352. 
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ways that Office was instrumental in transacting the foreign and Ottoman embassy 
correspondences. 
In the second step of the implementation of public diplomacy, the Foreign 
Ministry tried to influence the foreign newspapers through various controlling and 
prevention policies. In that way, the Sublime Porte statesmen planned to expose the 
capability and power of the Ottoman foreign diplomacy and so achieve an effective 
and successful level of public diplomacy within the European arena. The Ottoman 
Embassies and the Translation Office of the Foreign Ministry were the main 
channels of that policy. By training a newly-emerging Muslim translator (later to be 
bureaucrats), the Translation Office provided a means to the intelligence-based 
transformation experienced in Europe. By sending them to Europe as embassy 
agents, the Foreign Ministry cultivated its cadre with the first hand experience of 
Europe. In my third chapter, I explain the grounds for the Foreign Ministry’s 
acquisition of methods of public diplomacy for promoting the foreign policies of the 
Tanzimat Period. By doing so, I also explain in detail the various strategies adopted 
by the Sublime Porte. Each apparatus vindicated the efforts and competence of the 
Ottoman bureaucrats in dealing with the European powers. I show the varying nature 
of the public diplomacies—persuasion policies, financial aids, decoration with 
medals, prevention polices and legal actions. Related to these, the advantages and 
disadvantages which the Ottoman bureaucracy faced through each policy were 
propounded. I also emphasize the importance of the intelligence network established 
around axis of the Ottoman agents, the Translation Office and the Foreign Ministry 
for maintaining a stable foreign policy. By doing that, its effectiveness for forming a 
public diplomacy is attained.  
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1.2. Survey of Literature 
 
In his major studies of the late 19
th
 century Ottoman reforms, Roderic 
Davison explains in detail the efforts made in the path of westernization and the 
process of reformation correlated with that process. He regards the transformation of 
the system in the state and the diplomacy as the most effective tool and sign of the 
Ottoman modernization.
26
 The meticulously written works of Carter Findley
27
 points 
out the role and importance of the bureaucrats in the reorganization of the 
bureaucratic transformation and that reform in the whole government structure is 
believed to be consisted of small indispensable organs of the system. On the other 
hand, as a complementary, Ali Akyıldız28 gives a detailed scheme of how the 
Ottoman bureaucratic system underwent changes as an institution and what kind of 
cadres and structures emerged as consequence of that transformation. The work of 
Ilber Ortaylı shows the importance of the 19th century reforms conducted by Ottoman 
statesmen of the 19
th
 century. In his works, he highlights the struggle given by the 
bureaucratic and intellectual classes while showing how at the same time enormous 
problems of the state had to be taken care of. In that respect, Ortaylı regards the 19th 
century Ottoman Empire as the longest century.
29
 Stanford Shaw’s30 works enables 
the researcher to visualize that transformation within a wider framework. Shaw 
                                                        
   26 Roderic Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire; 1856–1876, ( Princeton; Princeton University 
Press, 1963), and Nineteenth Century Ottoman Diplomacy and Reforms (Istanbul; the Isis Press, 
1997). 
   27 Carter Findley, Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire (Princeton-New Jersey; Princeton 
University Press, 1980). 
   28 Ali Akyıldız, Osmanlı Merkez Teşkilatinda Reform (1836–1856), (Istanbul; Eren, 1993). 
   29 Ilber Ortaylı, Imparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı  ( Istanbul; İletişim Yayınları, 1999); 
   30 Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey; 
Volume II  (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1977). 
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evaluates the history of the 19
th
 century as the history of modernization in which the 
will of the power accounts and that will is applied to the system. Each of the state 
organs and their role in the system is regarded important to analyze. All these works 
draw a true and vivid picture of the transformation process that the Ottoman 
bureaucracy experienced during the 19
th
 century. The organization concerning the 
inner structure of the Foreign Ministry of the Sublime Porte resulted in an elaborate 
bureaucratic state institution that became pivotal in the conduct of Ottoman foreign 
diplomacy.  
After analyzing modern literature on Ottoman bureaucratic transformation 
and diplomatic developments affiliated to it, I noticed that there had been relatively 
little archival research on the functions of the Foreign Ministry and its agents as 
modern state intermediaries providing a channel to strengthen and to conduct the 
public diplomacy. While the works of Roderic Davison provides the researcher with 
a valuable analysis of how and in what ways the Ottoman Empire managed to 
conduct its foreign diplomacy, there is not much research made specifically focusing 
on the public diplomacy through the lenses of the archival documents.
31
  
The lacunae of the existing literature stimulated me to look the archival 
documents to set up the background of my research. There are voluminous 
documents in the Foreign Ministry, and the 19
th
 century Ottoman archival records are 
waiting to be explored on the issue. Yet for the limited size of my work, I carried out 
a small scale research by choosing to delve into the materials in the Translation 
Office which was the important yet invisible auxiliary of Foreign Ministry. Certain 
documents I found in the archives of the Translation Office helped me to generate 
arguments and led me to this research. In particular, documents from the Tanzimat 
                                                        
  31 Sezai Balcı, “Osmanlı Devleti’nde Tercümanlık ve Bab-ı Ali Tercüme Odası,” Doktora Tezi, 
Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tarih Anabilim Dalı (Ankara; 2006). 
15 
 
Period (1839–1876) about the issues of foreign newspapers became main archival 
source for my research. These documents served as examples of the public 
diplomacy of the Foreign Ministry maintained through the channels of Translation 
Office and Ottoman embassies. By conducting research over the phenomena 
described in these documents and trying to analyze the documents based on their 
content, and, in parallel with the political conditions of the time, I believe that my 
research will contribute to a better understanding of Ottoman diplomacy during the 
19
th
 century.  
The time frame of my research concerns only the Tanzimat Period (1839–
1876). I begin with attempts to initiate reforms, followed by the revolts and the 
rebellions that occurred in subsequent decades, and then continue my focusing on the 
political and diplomatic concerns of the Sublime Porte, in both internal and external 
arenas. The 37 year period witnessed the many successes and occasional failures in 
attempts toward bureaucratic reform. An abundance of archival documents shed light 
on the inner functioning of the Ottoman bureaucratic system, especially of the 
Foreign Ministry, in the diplomatic affairs. 
Most of the Ottoman Empire went through a thorough transformation process 
in the 19
th
 century, which was mainly implemented in the area of bureaucracy. The 
internal problems based on the economic concerns, the revolts in the provinces and 
the restlessness of the non-Muslim population urged the need for a change. 
Considering also that some portion of these problems were aggravated by the 
provocations of Europe and the intensification of the foreign affairs already 
necessitated a direct contact with Europe;  the Ottoman Empire took steps to get 
integrated into the European system. The exigency to explain itself to Europe 
compelled the Empire advance itself in the area of foreign diplomacy. 
16 
 
Simultaneously, a perception took hold gradually that “the earlier conception of 
reform as a reaffirmation and reinstatement of the Ottoman practices” should be left 
behind.
32
 Instead, new solutions were to be sought. The resolution came with the 
emergence of a modern bureaucratic structure. 
 The newly installed Foreign Ministry was the cresset of the bureaucratic 
system in adapting itself to the norms of foreign diplomacy. The bureaucrat-
statesmen that rose in that section got acquainted, from the very beginning of their 
career, with the European system. The Translation Office as a part of it, in that 
respect, was the pioneer of training these future statesmen. 
My research is based on the archival documents of the Translation Office 
(Tercüme Odası Evrakı) at Prime Ministery’s Archives (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi) 
in Istanbul. The documents that were specifically concerned with the foreign 
newspapers became the center of the analysis on which I constructed my thesis. The 
role of the Foreign Ministry in public diplomacy, and the richness and volume of the 
documents available meant that I could extend my research on the documents of the 
Foreign Ministry archives as well as other 19
th
 century Ottoman documents. 
Nevertheless, as the size of my thesis requires, I started with a small yet quite 
important area of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry. The Translation Office was the 
most important yet rather invisible back kitchen of the Foreign Ministry. Becoming 
firstly as the center for the training of the future Ottoman bureaucrats, the Translation 
Office later on acquired the importance for providing the information circulation 
between the Foreign Ministry and its agents abroad. The documents about the foreign 
newspapers in the Translation Office archives provided me with enough sources to 
show the nature of that aspect of Ottoman foreign policy.  
                                                        
     32 Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, p. 135. 
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The correspondence between the envoys of the Ottoman Empire stationed 
abroad, the Translation Office and lastly the Foreign Ministry made me better 
understand the nature of the intelligence network and the flow of information, and 
the ways public diplomacy functioned in the Foreign Ministry. In addition to these 
correspondences, Translation Office archives include reports by Ottoman 
representatives, based on their first-hand observation. These documents, in a way, 
provide an access to the mindset of 19
th
 century Ottoman diplomats and bureaucrats. 
Their observations and assessments of events, and their competence to regard these 
evaluations within the context of the Ottoman foreign diplomacy, help researchers 
reconstruct the nature of 19
th
 century Ottoman diplomacy.  
In addition to archival materials, I use many secondary sources to support my 
analysis and to provide historical context. These sources include recent works on the 
political and institutional modernization process of Tanzimat Period, the 
transformation of the Ottoman foreign policies form the post of Reis-ül Küttab to the 
transformation of it as Foreign Ministry. To understand the nature of conducting 
public diplomacy, I made use of some works related to the terminology of the public 
diplomacy. The biographical studies of individual dragomans and dragomanate 
business, the sources on the emergence of Translation Office and its actors are also 
examined briefly. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE EMERGENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTRY AND THE 
CONDUCT OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
 
 
2.1. The Transformation of the Scribal Service and the Emergence of the  
 Foreign Ministry 
 
 In the pre-modern period of the Ottoman Empire, the Imperial Palace 
administration was the center of the government system, and there was the Sultan at 
the top of everything. The executive authority of the Sultan was carried out by the 
Grand Vizier (Sadr-ı Azam) and the Imperial Council (Divan-ı Hümayun).33 Yet, he 
was the sole decision-maker in the end. There were three main groups of power 
circle surrounding the Sultan. These were askerîyye (military), ilmîyye (religious 
establishment) and Sadrazamlık Makamı (Grand Veziarete). The kalemîyye (scribal 
service) came later as a group of officials with lesser impact on the politics of the 
pre-modern period. Nişancı (Chancery) being the head of that group was responsible 
                                                        
     33 Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu,“Divan-ı Hümayûn’dan Meclis-I Mebusan’a Osmanlı Imparatorluğu’nda 
Yasama,” Tanzimat; Değişim Sürecinde Osmanlı Imparatorluğu  (Istanbul; Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür 
Yayınları, 2008), p. 374. 
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to deal with all the formal official works of the imperial administration. These works 
basically comprised of the government correspondences and the records on the land 
tenure. All these offices were situated in the Imperial Palace. Findley evaluates this 
pre-modern government system as the amalgamation of the authority and tradition 
closely associated with each other.
34
 For concerning the decision-making process of 
the foreign diplomacy, these former groups were on the foreground till the 18th 
century when kalemîyye under Reis-ül Küttab (the Chief Scribe) gained importance.35 
Even at that point, according to Ortaylı, it was not possible to talk about an 
administration of a foreign diplomacy independent from the Palace.
36
 
 The tasks normally entitled to the responsibility of the foreign ministry were 
carried out by Nişancı in the early periods of the Ottoman Empire. This post was 
active since the first half of the 15
th
 century, while during the reign of Mehmed II, it 
actually developed along with the increasing responsibilities.
37
 Though taking care of 
all the diplomatic correspondences, Nişancı was not more than civil servant with the 
mere task of providing that communication. The person responsible for the foreign 
affairs was Sadr-ı Azam.38 He had his own council of state known as Ikindi Divanı. 
There Sadr-ı Azam with his subordinates gathered every Tuesday and Thursday to 
head the discussions on different problems of the administration.
39
 
 In the pre-modern Ottoman Empire, the voice of Reis-ül Küttab was not heard 
frequently, but his office started to be more visible during & after compared the 18
th
 
century. There is still no comprehensive study about the origins of the office of Reis-
                                                        
     34 Findley, Ottoman Civil Officialdom, p.7. 
     35 Recep Ahıskalı, Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatı’nda Reis-ül Küttablık (XVIII.) (Istanbul; Tarih ve 
Tabiat Vakfı, 2001),  p. 201. 
     36 Ilber Ortaylı, “Osmanlı Diplomasisi ve Dışişleri Örgütü,” Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Türkiye 
Ansiklopedisi, V. 1 (Istanbul; İletişim Yayınları, 1985), p. 278. 
     37 Sevgi Gül Akyılmaz, “Reis-ül Küttab ve Osmanlı Hariciye Nezareti’nin Doğuşu,” Doktora Tezi 
(Konya; Selçuk Universitesi, 1990),  p. 38. 
     38 Ibid, p. 47. 
     39 Ibid, p. 76. 
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ül Küttab. While this office was clearly mentioned in Fatih Kanunnamesi, according 
to Akyıldız, it was still present even before that time. Working under Nişancı in the 
palace, he was the head of the scribes and katibs (clerks) that busied themselves with 
various correspondences. Reis-ül Küttab was usually selected from the kalemmîyye 
class and he remained standing during the Imperial Council meetings. He was only 
allowed to sit in the lesser consul meetings. All the correspondences, except the ones 
concerned with fiscal and military business, were checked and inspected by him.
40
 
With the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent his position slowly gained prominence. 
The Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 became the milestone for the future of Reis-ül 
Küttablık (the institution Chief Scribary) as the following lines will describe. 
Rami Mehmed Efendi (1655–1707) was serving in his second tenure as a 
Reis-ül Küttab41 when he sat down to negotiate with Austria for Karlowitz Treaty. 
For previous career advantages of Reis-ül Küttabs already paved the way for the 
prospective rise of that office in 1699. Before Rami Mehmed Efendi’s appointment, 
the previous chief scribes already had few occasions to affect the foreign policies of 
the Ottoman Empire. Of course, that only happened when they were given certain 
assurance of safety and courage.
42
 For instance, they could take the initiative in their 
own hands concerning the negotiations that were in favor of the Ottoman Empire. In 
that case they were allowed to accept the provisions without consulting, albeit they 
had to wait for the directions from the Palace if the meeting was not going well.
43
 
The reason was that, there were still other top hierarchical echelons (Sultan, Sadr-ı 
Azam and to a much lesser extent Nişancı) to affect the decisions-making process 
before coming to the office of Reis-ül Küttab. As these previous examples will be 
                                                        
     40 Akyıldız, Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Merkez Teşkilatı’nda Reform; (1836–1856),  pp.70-71. 
     41 Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmanî IV  (Istanbul; Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996), p. 1348. 
     42 Rifa’at Ali Abou-El-Haj, The Reis-ül Küttab and Ottoman Diplomacy at Karlowitz, Ph.D ( 
Princeton; Princeton University, 1963), p. 35.  
     43 Ahıskalı, Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatı’nda Reis-ül Küttablık (XVIII.), p. 218. 
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addressed in section on Ottoman diplomacy, the contribution the negotiation of Rami 
Mehmed Efendi made is briefly explained here to exert the changing nature and roles 
of the Ottoman administration in the late 17
th
 and early 18
th
 centuries concerning the 
foreign affairs in international diplomacy.  
Ad Hoc diplomacy in Europe was slowly abandoned by one European state 
after another starting from the 15
th
 century. Italian city states were the first ones 
which established and applied the permanent embassy system then. Venice sent his 
ambassador Bartelcini Marsello to the Ottoman Empire for a permanent embassy as 
early as 1453.
44
 While the number of permanent embassies increased over time in the 
European continent, the Ottoman Empire still continued with its Ahidnâme tradition 
(kind of an imperial ferman given by the Sultan) as official agreement with the 
affairs of the other state powers. Before reaching to the reign of Selim III (1789–
1807), there was not any state agency being constantly active in major European 
capitals.
45
 For one reason; till the end of the 17
th
 century, the Ottoman Empire 
believed in its superiority over the other European powers. According to Ortaylı, 
apart from feeling superior in regard of neglecting the establishment of permanent 
embassies, there were other rational reasons behind it. Ortaylı argues that the 
connection provided by the merchants and religious men of European powers in 
other monarchies was not present in the Ottoman Empire, which in return added to 
the unilateralism of the Ottoman Empire’s foreign policy. When the conference 
system came into being in Europe with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, it was out of 
question for the Ottoman Empire to be a part of it at that time as it was still 
unconventional.
46
 The increasingly complex nature of the political relations made it 
                                                        
     44 Cahit Bilim, “Tercüme Odası” OTAM ( Ankara, 1990), p. 29. 
     45 Ercümend Kuran, Avrupa’da Osmanlı İkamet Elçiliklerinin Kuruluşu ve İlk Elçilerin Siyasi 
Faaliyetleri (1793–1821), Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsi Yayınları: 92 (Ankara; 1988), p. 10. 
     46 Ilber Ortaylı, “Osmanlı Diplomasisi ve Dışişleri Örgütü”, p. 278. 
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hard to solve problems on mutual terms. That meant to be the emergence of 
multilateral diplomacy while the Ottoman Empire was still trying to establish the 
foreign relations on at least reciprocal basis if not always unilaterally.
47
   
While these developments taking place in Europe, Ottoman Empire lost huge 
territories in Central Europe along with its reputation as an undefeatable military 
power in 1699. With this turn of events, Ottomans became aware that the diplomatic 
rules of the foreign policy should be adopted. However, accustomed to exert its own 
will against its opponents, the Ottoman Empire caught unprepared for the diplomatic 
policies of the international foreign affairs. There was not any advanced and 
prevailing education on the art of diplomacy, and not many people qualified to carry 
out that task in parallel with the norms of European diplomacy. In that case, the 
Ottoman statesmen preferred to make use of the best officials they had. Reis-ül 
Küttab Mehmed Rami Efendi and Chief Dragoman of the Imperial Palace Alexander 
Mavrakordato (Iskerletzade Alexander, 1641–1709) were chosen as chief delegates 
for the negotiation. While the former had the ability and capability to support the 
interests of the Ottoman Empire, the latter became quite helpful during the 
negotiations thanks to his knowledge of foreign languages and European ways.
48
 
This occasion manifested the importance of the Ottoman dragomans as prominent 
actors taking their place in the state affairs along with other Ottoman authorities, as 
would be discussed further in the upcoming parts of this study. 
While Reis-ül Küttablık strengthened its power in the state administration as 
becoming the first official to learn all state affairs after the Sultan and Grand Vezir; 
correlating with that another development already took place to change the fate of 
both Reis-ül Küttab and Ottoman administration. The very first initiative to lay the 
                                                        
     47 Alkım Uygunlar, “Osmanlı Imparatorluğu’nda Modern Diplomasi ve Murahhaslık,” Yüksek 
Lisans Tezi, Osmangazi Universitesi (Eskişehir; 2007), p. 3. 
     48 Abou-El-Haj, The Reis-ül Küttab and Ottoman Diplomacy at Karlowitz, p.135. 
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foundations of the Sublime Porte (Bab-ı Ali) was taken by the Grand Vizier Koca 
Derviş Mehmed Paşa (1653–54) during the reign of Mehmed IV (1648–1687). When 
Halil Paşa Palace was given to him as a residence, he furnished the place with his 
own money. That palace became the ‘Paşa Kapısı’ (Porte of Pasha), a new place of 
government administration to a certain extent.
49
 With the start of Köprülü Period 
(1656–1683), the Grand Viziers belonging to that family became very powerful in 
the state affairs. During that period, the chamber of the Grand Vizierate was 
separated from the Palace and it became the main center of government business.
50
 
While Nişancı remained in the palace, Reis-ül Küttab moved to the chamber of 
Grand Vizierate. That shift from the Palace was the first step on the path of the 
bureaucratic transformation. Under the authority of the Grand Vizier, Reis-ül Küttab 
took a semi-independent position from the palace. All the business concerning the 
foreign policy of the Empire ran under his responsibility after the Peace of 
Karlowitz. Nevertheless, no matter how powerful he became in his post, Reis-ül 
Küttab still remained the obedient servant of the Sultan and the Grand Vizier in the 
decision-making process. In other words, his power could not be compared with the 
Foreign Minister of the 19
th
 century Ottoman Empire.
51
 
The second achievement in the way of bureaucratic transformation was 
realized when the new bureaucratic cadres were reorganized as a solution for the 
increasing volume of business. As a consequence of that, the rules of working 
conditions and appointments were rearranged systematically on the modern basis. 
Bab-ı Ali was established at last in 1718 when the Grand Vizier Nevşehirli Ibrahim 
Paşa (1718–1730) returned from the Peace of Passarowitz (21 July 1718) with the 
                                                        
     49 Ismail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Devleti’nin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı  (Ankara; TTK, 
1984), p. 250. 
     50 Akyılmaz, “Reis-ül Küttab ve Osmanlı Hariciye Nezaretinin Doğuşu,” p. 77. 
     51 Ibid, p. 160. 
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Sultan Ahmed III (1703–1730).52 Along with that the office of Reis-ül Küttab was 
extended as a requirement of the increasing volume of official assignments. Before 
the 18
th
 century, that office included Beylik Kalemi (the Section of Beylik), Tahvîl 
Kalemi (Section of Assignment of Benefices in Land) and Ruûs Kalemi 
(Appointment Section). The first section conducted all the official government 
correspondences and kept the copies of the documents. The second one was 
accredited with the preparation of all berats and fermans while at the same time 
attending to the registration of tımar and zeamet (land tenures). The last as could be 
deduced from its name was responsible with everything concerned about the 
appointment of the officials including their salaries. That picture clearly manifests 
the role of the kalemiyye group in the pre-modern time Ottoman Empire. Amedî 
Kalemi (Office of the Receiver),  Mektubî-i Sadr-ı Âli  Kalemi (Office of the 
Corresponding Secretary) and Divan-ı Hûmayun Tercümanı (Translator of the 
Imperial Divan) and  lastly Divan-ı Hûmayun Kalemi (Office of the Imperial Divan) 
were added to the official sections of Reis-ül Küttab. That was the panorama of the 
office of Reis-ül Küttab functioning in the Sublime Porte by 1789. Divan-ı Hûmayun 
Kalemi incorporated all three traditional post of the chief scribe in his body as the 
lower echelons of the system.
53
 Yet, the other sections were embellished with newly 
organized division of works. 
Amedî Kalemi undertook all the previous responsibility of Beylikci and 
Mektubî on the foreign affairs. The section became like a secretary to Reis-ül Küttab. 
It gained the privileges of being acquainted with the secret state affairs while 
controlling the correspondences between the Sublime Porte and the Imperial Palace. 
Before, the recording of laws, the transactions applied to the conditions of the non-
                                                        
     52 Jean Deny, “Bab-ı Ali,” EI, Vol. 1 (Leiden; Brill, 1986), p. 836. 
     53 Findley, Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire, p. 75. 
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Muslim communities within the Ottoman Empire, the negotiations carried out with 
the other foreign ministries and the capitulations given to them were all implemented 
by that Beylikci Office.
54
 And these correspondences were usually in the knowledge 
of Sadr-ı Azam as Nişancı was providing the circulation of information. From 18th 
century onwards, there also appeared divisions of powers. The flow of information 
was maintained through different ranks of official posts. The bureaucrats working 
under a Grand Vizier acted more or less semi-independently from the Sultan. Amedî 
Kalemi also bore the task of performing many duties about the foreign policy. Every 
document that related to the foreign policy of the Grand Vizier was kept there.  
Amedci attended the foreign state meetings besides the Chief Scribe along with the 
Translator of the Imperial Divan. When the permanent embassies in Europe were 
established; Amedî Kalemi “assumed the duties of registering the reports from the 
ambassadors, writing the answers, decoding the ciphers, and other related 
business.”55 He also collected the revenues of the Chief Scribe.56 Divan-ı Hümayun 
Tercümanı as will be analyzed in another section was the right-hand man of the chief 
scribe for the international negotiations.  
Another interesting fact was about Mektubî Sadr-ı Alî Kalemi which was 
working under the Chief Scribe and was in the position of the secretary of the Grand 
Vizier. All the correspondence and intercommunication of Sadaret was going under 
its inspection.
57
 The dual position of that section asserted the fact that the Grand 
Vizier was trying to hold the office of the Chief Scribe totally under his own control. 
For Ortaylı, that was also one very significant aspect of the later Foreign Ministry. 
                                                        
     54 Ibid, p. 74. 
     55 Bernard A. Lalor, “Promotion Patterns of Ottoman Bureaucatic Statesmen from the Lâle Devri 
until the Tanzimat,” Güneydoğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi I (Istanbul Üniversitesi; Edebiyat 
Basımevi, 1972), p. 85. 
     56 Akyıldız, Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Merkez Teşkilatı’nda Reform, p. 71. 
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He thinks that the Ottoman modernization kept the traditional organization of foreign 
affairs in the newly established Foreign Ministry. In the same way, the Grand 
Vizierate and Foreign Ministry were always intertwined to each other. Most 
outstanding parts of the Foreign Ministry documents that piled in the records of the 
Grand Vizierate, except for the embassy correspondences, could be given as 
evidence to that.
58
 It could be inferred that the Grand Vizierate aimed at forming a 
power center on its own by bringing the important sections under its authority. In 
other words, the powerful Sublime Porte of the 19
th
 century was more or less the 
reorganized and strengthened version of the Grand Vizierate and its Ikindi Divanı.59 
That shift of power from the Palace to the Sublime Porte accelerated the pace of the 
modernization of the bureaucratic system and as a more secular institution eased the 
way for integration to the European system. 
As a third step on the way of transformation; career lines and appointment 
patterns underwent a formidable change. Power control on politics shifted from 
askerîyye and ilmiyye class to kalemiyye class. With the rise of kalemiyye members 
to the office of Pasha, the tradition of “Efendi turned Paşa” began. For instance, Reis-
ül Küttabs (Reis Efendis of earlier times) would become Paşas. The chief scribes 
were sent to the provinces as governors, the position which was filled usually by the 
military class people. 
60
 Till the late 17
th
 and early 18
th
 centuries, the main 
qualification for the appointment to higher posts was the literacy. That was a 
privilege cherished by few elite statesmen for a very long time. Then came “the 
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requirement to serve the state, the faith, and be in the Ottoman way.”61 On many 
occasions, the elements of birth, wealth and back-up were also popular over the 
proficiency and capability of the candidates.
62
 Tarîk-i kalemiyye (the bureaucratic 
career) started with the rank as mülâzim, şakird or kâtib (apprentice, student or 
scribe), and selections for higher ranks were made after a long time of training and 
sometimes by chance. Irregular payments prevented the well-functioning of the 
posts. Many inefficient people held the posts while bribery became a common 
practice. In the first step, with the reform of Selim III at the end of the 18
th
 century, 
the number of bureaucratic personnel was limited according to the aim of enhancing 
the quality of the officials. As the secrecy of the state affairs were known all by the 
sections of Amedî and Mektubî, the standards and the selection process of 
government officials were highly demanding. Especially, the officials selected for 
the purpose should be capable in their professions and loyal to the Ottoman Empire. 
The edict of Selim III regarding this issue demanded that sensitivity in the selection 
procedure.
63
 
At the lower echelons, real changes in the bureaucratic circles were 
completed by the centralization policies of Mahmud II (r.1808–1839). The Ottoman 
Empire underwent huge transformations during the reign of Mahmud II. The 
attempts of Mahmud II to establish a centralized government brought about the 
emergence of the civil bureaucracy.
64
 Many of the old institutions were dismantled, 
new ones were established and others reconstructed.
65
 By 1830s onwards, the 
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bureaucratic regulations reached their perfection close to the western ways. Kalem 
Efendileri (gentlemen bureaucrats) were replaced by the newly transformed civil 
officials of the state (mülkiyye memurları) who differed from their former colleagues 
by implementing state policies as well as carrying out the traditional tasks of keeping 
records and governing the administration system. Hierarchy of the civil ranks was 
regulated by discharging the annual reappointment system (tevcihat). Monthly 
salaries were put on a regular system of payment, disciplinary codes were established 
for the officials and the official’s status as the slave of the Sultan was reduced.66 The 
centralization policies of Mahmud II resulted in the enlargement of the scribal offices 
or with the term of Findley “civil officialdom.” Findley asserts that there were 869 
central kalemiyye offices in Istanbul between years 1777–1797. The officials 
working there reached to 1.500. The total was both low and their responsibilities 
were not that much qualified at the time. A century later, between the years 1877–
1908, that number amounted to 92.137.
67
 
In 1836, Foreign Ministry was established within the Sublime Porte as a 
separate organization. Within a year, the officials working in the Sublime Porte were 
divided into two groups; one group became the part of foreign ministry while the 
other worked for the ministry of interior.
68
 By 1837, the Sublime Porte was 
organized in the following way; at the top of everything there was still the Sultan. 
Sultan Mahmud II accepted to share his power to certain extent with the new 
consultancy organizations. Under him came Meclis-i Vâlâ-yı Ahkâm-ı Adliye 
(Supreme Council of Judicial Organizations) and Dar-ı Şura-yı Bab-ı Âli 
(Consultative Assembly of the Sublime Porte). Foreign Ministry (Hariciye Nezareti), 
Ministry of Interior (Dahiliye Nezareti) along with Ministry of Justice (Divan-ı 
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Deavi Nezareti) were the sub-sections of the reorganized Sublime Porte. As being the 
centre of attention in this thesis, Foreign Ministry and its sections would be pictured 
henceforward on the base of Ottoman foreign policy. Other organizations and 
ministries of the 19
th
 century Sublime Porte would not be taken into consideration 
unless needed.  
After the reorganization, the Foreign Ministry was divided into two main 
sections: the Foreign Affairs Section and the Imperial Council Departments (Divan-ı 
Hümayun Kalemi and Mezahib-i Gayr-i Müslim Dairesi). The latter section handled 
all aspects of the internal affairs. Foreign Affairs Section on the other hand 
incorporated all departments of diplomacy and foreign trade; such as, receiving 
foreign representatives, dealing with the arrangements of the ceremonies, monitoring 
the foreign press. Apart from those, the Translation Office and the Archival 
Department (Hariciye Evrak Odası) were integrated into the Foreign Ministry. 
Within those sections, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs controlled “the internal reform 
legislation, the regulations about and the status of the foreign subjects and non-
Muslims in the Empire, and foreign commercial as well as political relations.”69 
According to Deringil, during the reign of Selim III, diplomacy was still more like a 
method for gaining time till being victorious in the military campaigns. Yet, the time 
Mahmud II embraced diplomacy as the sole weapon to use.
70
 Classification of the 
documents and analysis of their contents along with the record registrations stored in 
the Sublime Porte brought out the result of a modern bureaucratic state functioning 
systematically. They were the bureaucratic renovations resembling after the 
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European administrative organizations. These developments provided the suitable 
atmosphere to work more efficiently for carrying out the foreign diplomacy.
71
 
 Ottoman Empire ceased to apply unilateral diplomacy and became a part of 
the European state system since the late 17
th
 century.
72
 With the establishment of 
permanent Ottoman embassies in 1834, the volume of work and the flow of foreign 
correspondence increased enormously. The evolvement of the government 
institutions in parallel to the intensified connection with the outside world conduced 
to the enhancement of the work volume in the Foreign Ministry. To ease the process 
of the flow of correspondence, the statesmen changed the formal traditional writing 
style of the documents. The Rika style was replaced by the Nesih style because it was 
harder and more time consuming to continue with Rika. One could write with the 
new style more quickly without raising his arm.
73
 Elkab (the official style of address) 
was purified. Date, signature and seal were put on the official correspondence papers. 
Bab-ı Alî Evrak Odası (Records Office of the Sublime Porte) worked for keeping the 
registers of the correspondences of both the offices in Istanbul and also the 
provinces.
74
 In his article on the transformation of Ottoman correspondence with 
regard to writing style and the pace of the correspondence flow, Ortaylı gives many 
examples from the provinces and Anatolia.
75
 The elaboration of the Ottoman 
bureaucratic system and the redistribution & multiplication of tasks enabled the 
Foreign Ministry to get closer with European diplomacy and promoted a more stable 
yet intricate conduct of foreign diplomacy.  
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2.2. The Development of Diplomatic Translation in the Ottoman Empire 
 
The translation business usually conducted by dragomans was always 
important and influential in the Ottoman Empire. The dragomans in the Ottoman 
Empire were of various ethnic backgrounds; a majority was Ottoman non-Muslim 
subjects but some were foreign nationals. Over time, some of them used their access 
to European diplomats as an instrument to gain power in Ottoman decision-making 
process. The Ottoman Empire, for the most part, overlooked or ignored the extent of 
the dragomans’ role in foreign matters. Repeated cases of treason and disloyalty of 
some Greek dragomans in the 18th century served as the turning point for a need to 
reform the translation business within the bureaucratic reforms. By the early 19
th
 
century, the officials of the Sublime Porte acknowledged the need to improve the 
functioning of the translation office within the structure of the newly established 
Foreign Ministry. The general bureaucratic transformation brought about the 
eventual replacement of non-Muslim disloyal officials/dragomans in the Sublime 
Porte (Bab-ı Ali). As future statesmen, those newly recruited bureaucrats of the 
Foreign Ministry became the pioneers of the new Ottoman bureaucratic elite.  
European states were the first to make serious attempts to create a praxis of 
translation and to give capable translators a role in the establishment of continuous 
diplomacy. The Italian states systematically used dragomans as part of their 
established diplomacy during the Renaissance. It was also the period when 
techniques of modern diplomacy emerged, that is, “of sending an ambassador, 
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endowed with certain power, to represent a prince or a nation abroad.”76 Before that 
time, the use of Latin, the lingua franca in Europe, limited the need for translators 
between European states. Envoys of Western and Central Europe used Latin to carry 
out correspondence between each other.
77
 By the late 16
th
 century, however use of 
Latin remained in favor only among the clerics. Communication, to “be heard or, at 
least to hear yourself on the other part,” became a problem, especially in trading 
relationships.
78
 The primitive ruling system, limited powers of the sovereigns, lack of 
communication and the fact that geographical boundaries were not clearly defined 
and could be problematic to cross made it difficult to provide regular connection.
79
 
For that reason, the need for translators became evident only during the Renaissance, 
when the commercial network expanded overseas. The need for the translators 
increased along with the number of foreign missions. From the 17th century onward, 
many wealthy Christians sent their boys to university, especially in Italy, to receive a 
proper education. In general, this training included study of one European language 
and other skills in different fields.  
With the expansion of diplomatic relations in the Ottoman Empire 15
th
 
century onwards, the dragomans of some European countries began to learn Eastern 
languages such as Arabic, Persian and Ottoman Turkish. Venice, England, Austria, 
France and Russia founded permanent embassies in the Ottoman Empire. 
Afterwards, some European countries established their own institutions to train their 
translators. Those young functionaries (called language boys, jeunes de langue in 
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French, enfants de langue in French, giovane della lingua in Italian, and 
sprackhnaben in German depending on their origin) took on many positions in the 
embassies and consulates of their respective country. These future dragomans 
guaranteed the safety of the diplomatic relations between their embassies and the 
Ottoman Empire; being natives of the country they represented, there would not be 
any question of disloyalty, as was the case with Ottoman dragomans discussed 
earlier.  
Before Mehmed II established the first translation office in the Ottoman 
Imperial Council, translations (into and out of Turkish or a local language) were 
made independently by dragomans working for foreign embassies. The work of these 
translators mostly concerned trade transactions between the Ottoman Empire and the 
other border principalities belonging to Genoa or Venice. The dragomans of the 15
th
 
century were usually Roman Catholic or members of some smaller Armenian 
groups.
80
 Before the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, the Byzantine Empire was 
a center of social, economic and diplomatic activity. When Mehmed II conquered the 
city, he wanted Istanbul to be the center of Mediterranean trade and an “entrepot 
between Muslim and Christian world.”81 The subsequent growth of the Ottoman state 
(from a principality to an Empire) also had an impact on foreign relations of the time. 
At that time, the sultan relied on non-Muslim Ottoman subjects to conduct foreign 
trade. Toward the second half of the 15th century, translation became an independent 
occupation for individuals of Italian, Slavic, German, Serbian, Hungarian, Greek and 
Jewish backgrounds. One reason for the ethnic diversity among translators was the 
ways within which the trade was conducted which then extended to diplomatic 
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correspondence between the Western and Eastern powers. The importance of 
dragomans accelerated along with that development. By this time, the word 
“dragoman” meant interpreters as mediators between the two sides.82  
In the first half of the 16th century, the Ottoman State encouraged Muslim 
officers and tried to educate some as translators in return for tımar as a living. This 
attempt was not a long-term success. Indeed there were many Muslim officials with 
great skills in Ottoman Turkish, Persian and Arabic, called the elsine-i selase (three 
languages), as these languages were widely used in the Ottoman Empire. Few 
Muslim officials saw an urgent need to learn and use the spoken languages of Europe 
because of the superiority they felt over the European powers.
83
 The system was 
maintained as it had been the non-Muslim dragoman groups as before. Divan-ı 
Hümayun Tercüme Odası (Translation Office of the Imperial Council) was under 
Reisü’l-Küttab (the Chief Scribe), who was “officially the only head of the Chancery 
of the Imperial Council beneath the orders of the Grand Vizier and equal to the Chief 
Treasurer and the Ağas of the military corps.”84 The assignments given to the 
translators consisted of a set of different tasks. A dragoman working under that office 
was expected to translate everything coming to the Porte in various languages and 
about different topics concerning foreign affairs: 
In formal audiences, he translated the addresses of the European minister to the 
Sultan or the Grand vizier. In working sessions he translated the statements of 
the chief scribe, the foreign diplomats answering through their embassy 
translators. He also prepared the written accounts of these meetings. He was the 
only Ottoman Official to pay formal calls on European diplomats. In sum, he 
was the most important official after the Chief Scribe in the conduct of foreign 
affairs.
85
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Besides, the dragomans were seen as representing Western civilization in some 
respects regarding the education they had.  
The dragomans of the Imperial Council under Reisü’l Küttab (Chief Scribe) 
were still of many nationalities in the 16th century, but the election was made mostly 
among the converted subjects of the Empire.
86
 The first known one among this group 
was Yunus Bey, of Greek origin. According to sources, he was captured as a young 
boy from Modon during the siege of the city by Bayazıd II (r. 1481–1512) in 1500. 
While in Venetian sources he was known to be the son of one Taroniti Zorzi, 
Ottoman sources gave his father’s name as Abdul- Rahman.87 Yunus Bey became the 
chief dragoman of the Imperial Divan during the reign of Selim the Grim (1512–
1520). He was sent to Venice a few times and conducted several successful foreign 
correspondence with French diplomats. Hitzel also writes of another famous 
translator, Murad Bey. Of Hungarian origin, Murad Bey was educated in Vienna and 
could speak Arabic, Ottoman Turkish, Persian and Croatian besides his mother 
tongue.
88
 Ali Ufki Bey was the last of the converted dragomans. He lived in the 
second half of the 17th century and his Christian name appeared in the following 
formats in the sources; Albert Bobowski, Albertus Bobovius or Alberto Bobovio. 
There is no certain knowledge about his origin, but he was taken as a captive in 
Crimea by the Tatars and was brought to Istanbul.
89
 Apart from his position as a 
senior translator, he was known in Europe for his translated works on different 
aspects of music.
90
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The rich Jewish population formed another majority group among the 15th 
and 16th centuries’ translators. Banished from their homeland, particularly Spain and 
Portugal in 1492, many Jews were accepted within the Ottoman Empire. These new 
arrivals formed a unique group with the Jewish refugees of Sicily.
91
 Discovering the 
significance of European languages in the Ottoman Empire, the exiled Jews used 
their skills in many areas of the Ottoman Empire. Up to the 20
th
 century, they were 
influential in trade, banking and international diplomacy. As the dragomans of the 
Imperial Council and European Embassies, they expanded their network through 
many channels. In some occasions, they also took role of mediating between the 
local residents and foreign elements.
92
 One outstanding figure of many was Moşe 
Hamon, physician doctor to Selim the Grim (1512–1520) and Suleiman the 
Magnificient (1520–1566).93 Able to operate both as court doctors and as translators 
for state affairs, Hamon and his fellows consolidated their place in high offices. The 
Jewish population in the capital kept their positions as translators and doctors 
throughout the 17th century, as well; but they became less important as another 
group, Greek Phanariots, rose to prominence.  
During the 17
th 
century, the translation profession passed into the hands of the 
Greek tebaa of the Ottoman Empire. The tebaa resided in the Fener (Phanar) district 
of Istanbul and were known generally as the Phanariote. They gained privileged 
positions as translators over time, and systematically opened the way for the 
professionalization of the translation occupation. The Phanariote were first exempted 
from the head tax (cizye) and since there was no regulation for monthly payment, 
they were granted as state officials with the collection of the head tax of the Greek 
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people living in the Aynaroz region (Mount Athos; Athonite; Agiorite)
94
. Osman 
Ergin bases this information on an archival document dated to 1819.
95
 The 
Kuruçeşme Rum School (Kuruçeşme Rum Mektebi) was founded in 1805 by 
Dimitraşko Moroz Beyzade as a training center (talimgah) for Greek students.96 The 
school followed the standards of European education, and it functioned in three 
languages; Ottoman Turkish, Greek and French.
97
 After attending Kuruçeşme Rum 
Mektebi, many Phanariote went to the University of Padua for further education. 
Before appointment as the dragomans of the Imperial Council (Divan-ı Hümayun 
Tercümanları), many Phanariots worked first as translators for the Ottoman naval 
forces.
98
 Each of the dragomans who belonged to a prominent family such as 
Mavragordatos, Kallimachis, Ghikas, and Hypsilantis was assigned many important 
posts when a foreign correspondence had to be carried out.
99
  
Within two centuries, these Phanariote dragomans rose to high positions in 
the Ottoman administrative system and they consolidated their powers by handing 
them down from father to son. They had a background of good education compared 
to other populations of the Ottoman Empire. Wealthy Phanariote families also had 
experience in trading activities with other countries. In addition to studies undertaken 
at the Patriarchal Academy in Istanbul, members of this group also attended 
academies established in Eastern Europe.  
One of the best examples of the Phanariote influence in the Ottoman foreign 
policy was Panayot Nikoussios (1613–1673) of Chios, considered the first 
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representative of the “Age of Great Rum Translators.”100 Nicousios was the Grand 
Dragoman of the Imperial Palace between. As holder of this position he was the 
second most-powerful Christian in the Ottoman administration, after the 
hospodarship of Wallachia-Moldavia and the Orthodox Patriarchate.
101
 Nikoussios 
had been educated at the Kuruçeşme Rum School under the supervision of the 
Patriarchate Church elder Meletios Syrigos: While there, he learned Arabic, Ottoman 
Turkish, Persian and philosophy. Then he went to the University of Padua to study 
medicine, Latin, mathematics and astronomy. After his return to Istanbul, he served 
the Austrian embassy for 25 years as a translator until the War of Kandiye broke out 
in 1669. This became the turning point in his career. During the war period he helped 
the Ottoman Empire to translate a letter coming from the king of Sweden, which led 
to his appointment as translator of the Imperial Council.  
Another Phanariote whose career followed a similar trajectory was Alexander 
Mavrakordato (1641–1709). He was also from Chios and he too educated cultivating 
himself as his predecessor Nikoussios had. Mavrakordato was first educated in 
philosophy and theology at St. Athanasius College in Rome, later he studied 
medicine at Padua and Bologna. Mavrakordato worked as a translator in the Sublime 
Porte for 25 years, from 1673. In addition to Italian and Latin, he also knew Arabic, 
Ottoman and Persian languages. Since he showed remarkable success in his career, 
Mavrakordato attended the conference of the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 with Rami 
Mehmed Pasha (1696–1703), Reisü’l-Küttab of the time. Being acquainted with 
Christian world and European court practices, he was qualified as one of the best 
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promoters of the Western political culture during his service in the Ottoman Imperial 
Council.
102
  
At the beginning of the 19
th
 century, Phanariote dragomans held the 
monopoly on translation by obtaining fermans (Imperial decrees) directly from the 
Sultan. The Ottoman State’s confidence in the Phanariote was just perfect. In 1709, 
the Head of the Translation Office in the Imperial Council, Terdjüman Başı (The 
Chief Dragoman) Iskerletzade Nicholos was first appointed as voivode of Boğdan 
(Moldavia) and Eflak (Wallachia) regions of the Empire.
103
 After 1711, appointing 
Greek people to hospodarship became a tradition.  
Toward the end of the 18
th
 century, activities of the Phanariote against the 
Ottoman Empire began to be noticed more frequently. In 1740 Alexander Gika, in 
1769 Nikola Drako, in 1812 Dimitrashko who attended the Treaty of Bucharest were 
blamed for spying on behalf of Russia and all were executed. Another was the case 
of Panayoti Kodrika. When Morean es-Seyyid Ali Efendi was the ambassador of the 
Ottoman Empire in Paris betweeen 179 –1802, he took Kodrika along with him to 
France as the embassy translator. But Kodrika turned out to be working on behalf of 
France; he gave correspondence between Ali Efendi and Istanbul to the French 
diplomat Talleyrand (1754–1838). He was also rumored to have offered a plan to 
Napoleon regarding how to split up the Ottoman Empire.
104
 
The modernization process along with the disloyalty of the Phanariote in the 
field drove officials of the Ottoman Empire to establish a professional translation 
office as part of a bureaucratic institution. That office should be first stripped of the 
Phanariote dragomans who held a monopoly on translation; it was to be reorganized 
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as a division of the Foreign Ministry (Hariciye Nezareti). The effort to establish a 
modern translation office was only realized in 1821. Before that time, Selim III 
(r.1789–1807) had suggested hiring dragomans from among the Muslim population. 
Yet the Imperial Council was still full of Phanariote dragomans, owing to the lack of 
education among the Muslim officers in the field. They could not compete with their 
Orthodox-Christian peers.
105
 The Greek Revolt of 1821 ended the Greek dragoman 
tradition, when, owing to rumors that he had joined the rebellion, the Chief 
Dragoman of the Imperial Council, Constantin Mourouzi, was executed.
106
 Serving 
as charge d’affaires of ambassadors, Phanariote were accused of misinterpreting 
information to the Empire.
107
 The dismissal and execution of Mourouzi left the 
Ottoman State to depend on the Muslim officials instead.  
By 18
th
 century onwards, Muslim students began to receive training that used 
the latest European educational methods. These young attendees were also “exposed 
to European patterns of thought and behavior.”108 The first personnel of the 
Translation Office in 1821 came from among the ranks of newly founded military 
schools. Among those schools the most famous were the Army Engineering School 
(Mühendishane-i Berri Hümayun), the Naval Engineering School (Mühendishane-i 
Bahri-i Hümayun) and the Civilian Medical School (Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Mülkiye-i 
Şahane). The first of the Muslim translators with a military education was Yahya 
Naci Efendi, a convert of Bulgarian origin. After graduating from the Army 
Engineering School, Yahya Naci Efendi became a teacher there. His first job in the 
Translation Office was to translate some important papers in Greek and French. Yet, 
Yahya Efendi had not mastered those languages. Out of necessity, Mahmud II 
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accepted the appointment of Stavraki Aristarchi, another Phanariote, in the former’s 
position. However, despite all precautions, in 1822 it was realized that Aristarchi was 
collaborating with Greek rebels against the Empire.
109
 He was immediately 
dismissed from his position and no Phanariote was formally hired by the Translation 
Office after this incident. Aristarchi case forced the officials of the Empire to 
generate solutions to train Muslim field officers in foreign diplomacy. Student 
missions were regularly sent to Europe 1830s onwards to receive the education 
needed for foreign affairs, along with the technical fields. Mahmud II was interested 
in training Muslim bureaucratic cadres. With the death of Yahya Efendi, Hoca Ishak 
Efendi (a Jewish convert) took over his position. He was proficient in French, Latin, 
Greek, and Hebrew along with Turkish, Persian and Arabic.
110
 Through his scientific 
studies, the terminology of western modern science for the first time entered into the 
Ottoman education curriculum.
111
  
During Hoca Ishak Efendi’s office in 1824, the Translation Office underwent 
a structural change and it was re-organized as two sections; Tercüme Odası 
(Translation Office) and Dil Odası (Language Office). While the former section dealt 
with the task of translation related to the foreign diplomacy, the latter served to teach 
European languages to officials from different departments of the state. The officials 
training there practiced French between each other during their leisure hours. Ishak 
Efendi’s rivalry with Reisü’l- Küttab Pertev Paşa in 1830 resulted in the latter’s 
dismissal from the post. He was replaced by Halil Esrar Efendi, the assistant and son-
in-law of Ishak Efendi, and two other officers: Mehmet Namık Paşa and Sir James 
Redhouse. Mehmet Namık Paşa was a reformist figure who had the leading role in 
the establishment of the Army Engineering School and Sir James Redhouse was the 
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famous Turkish lexicographer who was also a member of the Academy of 
Knowledge (Encümen-i Daniş).112 After decades of gradual changes, the Translation 
Office took its final form in 1833.  
The decade following 1833 was significant in modern Ottoman history 
because of the many internal and external crises faced by the Ottoman Empire. 
Foreign diplomacy entwined with inner problems, and the Ottoman State had to take 
protective steps to cope with such disturbances as revolts in the provinces. The 
Ottoman Army was defeated by Mehmed Ali, the Khedive of Egypt (1805–1848).113 
The Treaty of Hünkar Iskelesi signed after that incident could be regarded as a 
breakpoint from the military policies to diplomacy.
114
 According to Findley, the 
Egyptian Crisis was the reason for those civil officials in favor of European ideology 
to become the most effective actors in state affairs. For him, being away from the 
palace control, they tried to rebuild the imperial system with innovative legislations 
and policies.
115
  
The intensity of foreign relations as a result of foreign politics necessitated 
the emergence of the translator-statesmen. The Translation Office established in 
1833 “became the training ground for Ottoman diplomats, and also for the new 
intelligentsia who played a major role in ideological developments during the 19th 
century.”116 While it had been a small section of the Imperial Council, the 
Translation Office of the Sublime Porte (Bab-ı Ali Tercüme Odası) as a division of 
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the Foreign Ministry was a place of political importance and a channel for the 
intelligence network. Highly educated statesmen who came out of that office proved 
to be effective in both internal and foreign diplomacy issues of the 19
th
 century 
Ottoman agenda. Knowledge of French especially became a criterion to advance in 
position, thus the Translation Office became an inevitable stop for that education and 
an indispensable channel.
117
 Most of the embassy correspondences addressed to the 
Foreign Ministry had to stop first in the Translation. That’s because the fact that they 
were all written in French and had to be translated first. In that respect the 
Translation Office had the chance keep up with the foreign diplomacy by the Foreign 
Ministry via the Ottoman embassies. In that way, they also increased their experience 
in the conduct of foreign diplomacy. 
To reorganize the Translation Office, Reshid Pasha (1800–1858) after three 
years decided to incorporate it into the newly founded Foreign Ministry in 1836. He 
came out of Amedi office and was sent to Europe both to obtain an education and to 
re-establish the permanent embassies in Paris, London and Vienna. Upon his return 
home, Reshid Pasha first became the Head of the Foreign Ministry; in later years his 
position frequently approximated that of the Grand Vizierate.
118
 The Translation 
Office after 1836 consisted of two sections; the first
 
class (sınıf-ı evvel) and the 
second
 
class (sınıf-ı sani). The officials in the first class who proved their skills in 
translation and rhetoric gained the right to pass to the second
 
class. 
 During the Crimean War (1853–1856), foreign correspondence with Europe 
increased to a great extent. As a consequence, special clerks (mümeyyiz) were 
appointed in the Translation Office. These clerks were responsible for carrying out 
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correspondence with the legations of the strong European powers, such as France and 
Britain.
119
 In 1856, a Section of Foreign Correspondence (Tahrirat-ı Ecnebiyye 
Odası) was opened, working directly for the Foreign Ministry. Tahrirat-ı Ecnebiyye 
Odası organized the documents, kept records, distributed them to the relevant 
departments of the Foreign Ministry and stored copies in its archives.
120
 This 
expansion “implied another shift in the old cursus honorum, for the Translation 
Office now began to take precedence even over the Amedi Office.”121 
The main task of the Translation Office was the translation of many 
documents. These were all the reports in Arabic, Persian, French coming from the 
provinces, various laws and regulation exemplas of the outside world, the documents 
of the Ottoman embassies in Austria, Greece, England, France, Russia and Prussia, 
and the news published in the foreign press, and all the other documents coming 
from different sections of The Sublime Porte. As for the foreign press, one archival 
document revealed by Balcı reveals out that the Translation Office sometimes 
became the conductor of the public diplomacy. According to the document, one 
embassy official named Nolinski asked from the Chief Dragoman the permission of 
publishing news for the Ottoman Empire.
122
 
In the Translation Office of the Tanzimat Period, considerable importance 
was given to the education of Ottoman officials. Along with French, lessons of 
history, geography, calculation, belles letters, French Law and International Law 
were taught. With the outbreak of the Crimean War, the intensity of the relations 
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with Britain also necessitated training in English language.
123
 These rearrangements 
in the Translation Office brought about a reinvigorated cadre. The statesmen 
belonged to the new system continued their careers by cultivating themselves on 
various subjects. Those who were sent to Europe had their first training in the 
Translation Office. They found themselves in privileged positions in the 
administrative system when they turned back home.  
Ali and Fuad Pashas could be counted as among the best examples of these 
capable, well bred statesmen of the Tanzimat Period. Mehmed Emin Ali Pasha 
(1815–1871) was the son of an Istanbul shopkeeper and he began his education by 
attending the medrese. Ali Pasha then entered the scribal service of the Porte. He 
learned French in the Translation Office and was sent to Vienna (1835–1836) and St. 
Petersburg (1837) as a clerk. His experiences in Europe advanced his knowledge of 
foreign politics. He proved himself through his service to Reshid Pasha, acting as the 
latter’s personal scribe and translator during his tenure in London. Ali Pasha became 
a leading member of the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances (Meclis-i Vala-yı 
Ahkam-ı Adliye) and he became the Foreign Minister during Mustafa Reshid’s two 
terms Grand-Veziarete.
124
  
Keçecizade Mehmed Fuat Pasha (1814–1868) was another outstanding figure 
first trained in the Translation Office. He was a statesman known for his intelligence, 
his rich knowledge in French, medicine and diplomacy aside from his generosity, 
well-rhetoric and courageous attitude.
125
 As a son of the poet Izzet Molla, Mehmed 
Fuad was born in 1814 in Istanbul. Mehmed Fuad completed his education at the 
medical school and between 1834–1835 went to Tripoli as an army doctor. After his 
return to Istanbul, he entered the Translation Office and in 1839 he became the chief 
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dragoman of the Sublime Porte. In 1849, Fuad Pasha (Mehmed Fuad) negotiated the 
Hungarian refugee problem in St. Petersburg. In 1858, he represented the Sublime 
Porte at the Paris Conference on the problem of Danubian Principalities. He 
represented the Ottoman Empire at the Paris Peace Conference of 1858. Fuad Pasha 
served as the Foreign Minister of the Porte for five terms. He died in 1869 in Nice.
126
  
Both of these great statesmen are early examples of the importance of the 
Translation Office and the education and vision they gained through that affiliation. 
Their careers show that the Translation Office put the first seeds of the bureaucratic 
reform by bringing up people who were capable of carrying out these reforms.  
It is obvious that the process for the foreign diplomacy was not only the 
development of the translation business. It was part of an overall transformation of 
the Ottoman state system and its substantial integration into European diplomacy. 
Initially the Translation Office was regarded as instrumental only to conveying 
foreign correspondence; it gradually became an integral part of foreign diplomacy 
and modern bureaucratic state system. The officers were trained in the Translation 
Office were not merely dragomans but they later became outstanding statesmen in 
the Ottoman bureaucratic cadre. 
 
 
2.3. Public Diplomacy in the 19
th
 Century Ottoman Empire 
 
The term public diplomacy is actually a newly established word that gained 
importance at the end of the Cold War. Firstly used in 1960s, that specific field of the 
international diplomacy became the target of the statesmen for affecting international 
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diplomacy and interacting with foreign publics. Through public diplomacy; political 
and social connections could be established which in return would provide mutual 
understanding between different states and societies.
127
 While public diplomacy is 
most effective when appeals to the trust of the foreign publics,
128
 it is a field with 
wide-range of tools asserting its power both on the foreign public and international 
politics. In another words; public diplomacy could be considered as prerequisite to 
the establishment of successful foreign policy if applied successfully.  
Though started to be used as a new term, public diplomacy was indeed an old 
policy applied by many civilizations in different ways. As Nicholas Cull puts: “its 
constituent parts are old; as old as statecraft.”129  Listening others, advocacy, cultural 
diplomacy, exchange diplomacy and international broadcasting are regarded the most 
effective tools of today’s public diplomacy. The most effective and early examples of 
these constituent parts of public diplomacy were seen in the policies of foreign 
relations conducted by the ambassadors and envoys. The ambassadors in old times 
were entitled with three basic tasks; to represent their countries in foreign lands, to 
negotiate international agreements and to provide the flow of information from the 
countries they were serving in, to their own countries. To achieve these, ambassadors 
became the key center of a network which was basically established by “international 
communication in a formally specified setting.”130  
The Ottoman Empire applied some forms of public diplomacy earlier by 
sending its temporary ambassadors to abroad. The main aim of these visits in the pre-
modern Ottoman Empire was to inform the outside world about the Empire. 
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Enthronement of a Sultan or a birth of şehzade (prince), declarations of war and 
peace, and the offer of an alliance to another country or friendship were among the 
reasons why temporary ambassadors, entitled as fevkalâde elçi (exceptional 
ambassador), were sent abroad. As the different sefaretnames revealed, that was a 
common practice of how the Ottoman Empire gained information about events 
abroad. Besides these ambassadors; province governors of the borders in the East, 
Crimean Khans in the North, hospodars of Moldova and Wallachia in the West, the 
Republic of Dubrovnik and the Kingdom of Transylvania as well as the networks of 
the Ottoman and foreign merchants were the indispensable official information (and 
intelligence) networks of the Ottoman Empire. Phanariote dragomans joined the list 
later. Thanks to their close acquaintanceship with the foreign embassy translators 
they became the ears and eyes of the Ottoman Empire in Europe up to the first 
quarter of the 19
th
 century.
131
 
The early examples of the public diplomacy based its success on three 
methods; vigilance, advice/advocacy and negotiation. These methods then left their 
place to more elaborated policies of dialogue, monologue and collaboration of the 
modern times. The Ottoman Empire adapted itself the public diplomacy by making 
use of vigilance, advocacy/advice and negotiation step by step before the 19
th
 
century. Vigilance meant the keeping up with everything going on in Europe and 
reporting each occasion to Istanbul. It sometimes bore the nature “managing the 
international environment by collecting and collating data about publics and their 
opinions overseas and using that data to redirect its wider public diplomacy.”132 That 
was the part of the conventional diplomacy and intelligence network. Advocacy 
meant that giving of some reasonable opinions to the Foreign Ministry in Istanbul 
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about certain cases while waiting for the instructions. It also included the agent’s 
effort to promote certain ideas and policies.
133
 Lastly, negotiation was usually 
unilateral and informal way of expressing the thoughts of the Sublime Porte to the 
statesmen of other countries. There were also many other famous examples accrued 
by the personal drive of the permanent ambassadors of the earlier times (the late 18
th
 
century.) 
It seems that, Yirmisekiz Çelebi Mehmed Efendi, for this respect, did a great 
job in his one year post to France (1720–21). His success during his stay contributed 
a lot to the good relations between the Ottoman Empire and France. His public policy 
campaign filled the minds of many French people with sympathy towards the 
Ottoman Empire.
134
 After the attempt to establish permanent embassies in 1791, 
some of the first ambassadors tried their best in conducting public policy. The 
ambassador of France Seyyid Abdurrahim Muhip Efendi for instance reported to 
Istanbul all the details of the French administration system during his 
ambassadorship in Austria (1791–1792). In his Sefaretname, he wrote many things 
about the administrative, fiscal and military aspect of the Habsburg Empire.
135
 
By 1790s, the most powerful weapon of Europe, the press got also the 
attention of the Ottoman ambassadors and statesmen. Even though that print 
capitalism was established many centuries before in Europe, according to Findley, it 
gained that much importance only towards the 19
th
 century as a result of rising 
nationalist movements.
136
 In that respect, the Ottoman officials were on time for 
catching up with the pace of that public tool of Europe. The press awareness obliged 
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them to focus on what was published and circulated around Europe.
137
 The first 
Ottoman ambassador to London, Yusuf Agah Efendi (1793–1796) sent all the 
translation of the news published in there and reported the rumors he heard on 
political affairs.
138
 Moralı Seyyid Ali Efendi as an ambassador to France (1796–
1802) had an interview with Foreign Minister Talleyrand (1754–1838) about the 
rumors that General Bonaparte was going to invade Egypt. He requested the 
journalists to be charged and the news to be contradicted.
139
 In similar way, Halet 
Efendi (1802–1806) took precautions to prevent the bad-intentions of some 
newspapers in France about the Ottoman Empire.
140
  
Nevertheless, these efforts were not enough to satisfy Selim III. He wanted to 
establish better relations with European states. The breakup of the French Revolution 
in 1789 made him to think that the establishment of permanent embassies was an 
urgent necessity.
141
 Regarding the expenditure allocated for the embassies, Selim III 
expected too much from his agents.
142
 By the late 18
th
 century, public policy 
campaigns were usually conducted for the internal administration of the Ottoman 
Empire like the amendments in economy, education, westernization and changes in 
the law system. Vigilance, advice/advocacy and negotiation of internal 
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administration were not enough by themselves.
143
 More elaborate modern 
bureaucratic organization was required for foreign diplomacy. At that point, 
embassies were the most important channel to pursue a healthy public diplomacy. 
Findley thinks that; 
“By nature, an embassy is a microcosm of the society it represents. The 
problems that might be manageable at home assume enlarged importance in a 
small exile community duty bound to keep up appearance and play a 
representational role.”144 
 
 The embassies of Selim III accelerated the pace of the process for entering the 
European politics. Many Muslim officials became proficient in foreign languages. 
Though they were not influential in affecting and controlling the European 
newspapers, they achieved to monitor and supply with the flow of information with 
their limited efforts.
145
 Nevertheless, the experiences and capabilities of the embassy 
officials were still far away from being competent. There was lack of network 
channels at the time and the brigandage events in the hospodarship of Wallachia and 
Moldova worsened the flow of correct information to the center. Besides, the 
Egyptian occupation (1798–1801) of Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821) put the 
Empire in difficult political position.
146
 
 The attempt of Mahmud II for the reestablishment of embassies improved the 
structure of the embassies to a great extent. Though the pre-Tanzimat period was not 
stable, the Reform Era was unlike that. The Foreign Ministry of the Sublime Porte 
acquired the well-educated officials of the Amedî Kalemi who trained themselves in 
the Translation Office from now on. The bureaucrats of these bureaus became the 
interlocutors of the foreign relations by advancing their experience in the Ottoman 
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embassies after completing their education in the Translation Office.
147
 The 
Translation Office which was founded to train Muslim officials in foreign languages 
and to breed trustworthy statesmen to establish a communication and correspondence 
network attained its goal in a short while.
148
 The embassy agents that grew out of the 
Translation Office as learned men of art of modern diplomacy did their best to carry 
the public diplomacy along with other duties.
149
 The officials Ottoman embassies 
followed up each development through wide circulation of various European 
newspapers. The Translation Office became the second instrumental agent for 
transacting the correspondences written about these newspapers. They first came 
there as not only the newspaper clippings but also the official correspondences to 
Porte were written in French, the official language of the 19
th
 century international 
diplomacy. They were translated and recorded there (by giving number and date) and 
sent to the other high sections.
150
 
 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
 
The transformation of the Foreign Ministry and the Translation Office as a 
sub-section of it were part of a general shift to carry out the state’s diplomatic 
expectations in cooperation with the modern military, administrative and educational 
systems of the Ottoman Empire. In that respect, it was not just a process in which the 
Ottoman state planned its formation according to nationalist concerns and dismissed 
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non-Muslim officials/ dragomans. The turn of the 18th century into the 19th was a 
transition period, during which the bureaucratic class emerged as a vital part of the 
Ottoman administrative system. The first step of modernization process was the 
training of well-educated statesmen to serve in bureaucracy. The interest in adapting 
European systems to the Ottoman situation was not the result of admiration of 
Europe. It was precisely because of the exigencies which resulted from inner 
problems.
151
 Still, the shift of power from the Imperial Palace to the Sublime Porte 
cannot be analyzed only through the dynamics of the inner system. The shift was also 
related to the Ottoman Empire’s essential integration into international diplomacy. 
Officials of the Ottoman Empire felt an urgent need to establish a place in 
international politics. Therefore, institutional reforms in general, and the foundation 
of the Foreign Ministry as part of the Sublime Porte, should be regarded in this wider 
context. The Foreign Ministry as a bureaucratic institution was a natural result of the 
transformation attempts and it grew in parallel to those efforts, serving the cause of 
increased effectiveness in the international arena those activities were becoming 
more intensified.  It became the pinnacle along with its offices for the conduct and 
maintenance of the 19
th
 public diplomacy. 
The path towards the latest form of Foreign Ministry from the office of 
Reisülküttablık was closely correlated to the foreign policies of the Ottoman Empire 
mainly intensified 17
th
 century onwards. That transformation process brought along 
with it the natural development concerning the development/conversion of 
dragomanate business. By the 19
th
 century, foreign policies and international 
diplomacy carried with them the emergence of well-educated Ottoman elite whom 
both have the qualification of diplomats and dragomans in the same package. When 
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the Foreign Ministry of the Sublime Porte grew in maturity with its above-mentioned 
Tanzimat-elite, the elaborate system of public diplomacy was conducted with much 
more ease. The public diplomacy of the pre-modern period became intricate and 
more fruitful when there was occurred a foreign diplomacy platform in which its 
conductors were more capable and its facilities were more accessible.  
Monitoring and closely watching over the foreign newspapers in that way 
became the most influential and effective trend of the 19
th
 century public diplomacy 
of Europe. As will be mentioned in the next coming chapter, the Ottoman Empire 
was conscious enough to catch up with that trend and availed itself of the very 
similar public diplomacy policies to be kept well-informed of the others.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE EMERGENCE OF PUBLIC OPINION AND MONITORING 
OF FOREIGN NEWSPAPERS IN THE 19
th
 CENTURY 
OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
 
 
Throughout the 19
th 
century, Ottoman authorities were well aware of the 
emerging and highly significant role of the newspaper as an arbiter of public opinion. 
Each government attempted to use the press to bolster its own interests and to 
monitor interpretations of the daily political agenda around the world. In 1805 
Metternich described the effect of newspapers on the changing relationship between 
governmental policy and society quite well:  
“The daily published bulletins of the French army with which Germany and all 
Europe are flooded are a new invention and deserve the most serious attention. 
The gazettes are worth an army of 300,000 men to Napoleon. Public opinion is 
the most powerful of weapons.”152 
 
In the Ottoman Empire, according to Davison, the first awareness of the European 
press occurred in the late eighteenth century, during the reign of Abdülhamid I 
(1774–1789). The Grand Vizier Seyyid Mehmed Pasha (1779–1781) created an 
office in his chamber to obtain and translate certain European newspapers; the 
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purpose was to inform himself and other divan members of the latest developments 
in Europe. During the 1790s, that awareness became widespread among officials, 
influenced by regular reports on the local press made by the ambassadors Selim III 
sent to Europe. Reports from these ambassadors often included posting sheets and 
clippings from the important newspapers.
153
  
As the patterns for acquisitions of intelligence and the information systems of 
the state changed, public press became a significant player in determining official 
policies. Print culture in Europe was the most effective means to learn about political 
developments in European countries. Monitoring European newspapers meant that 
Ottoman bureaucrats of the reform period could fine-tune the state’s relationship 
with its European interlocutors. Ottoman officers in the Foreign Ministry were taught 
to evaluate the articles that appeared in European newspapers. And the Translation 
Office of that ministry became the invisible yet quite effective channel behind the 
kitchen. So when, in the 1820s, the first local newspapers appeared in the Empire, 
such as Spectateur Oriental, Le Smyrneen, Le Courrier de Smyrne and Journal de 
Smyrne, the policy to monitor the European press was already well established.
154
  
In this chapter, I explore the monitoring of foreign newspapers by the 
Translation Office during the Tanzimat period. In the first part, my point is to show 
what European political news was deemed by officials of the Ottoman Foreign 
Ministry important to watch. By doing so, I also intend to figure out whether there 
was any reason why the Ottoman officials became interested in certain issues of 
European politics and the conflicts between European governments. The subject 
matter of interest included the parliamentary debates in England, the conflict 
between the French and Belgian Governments over the freedom of Belgian press, the 
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expansionist policies of England overseas, and the unification of Germany, among 
other topics. In the second part, I present the newspapers monitored by the Sublime 
Porte, which for the most part contained articles about the problems of the Ottoman 
Government and the provinces under its rule. These articles were mostly about the 
minority groups and revolts in the provinces, but others discussed the internal 
administration of the Empire such as finance or reform attempts. Based on these data, 
I explain why foreign press was interested in those issues and I show how the 
Ottoman Empire reacted toward these news items. All the data used here were based 
on the content of the official correspondences occurred between the Ottoman 
embassies abroad and the Foreign Ministry that conduit by the Translation Office. 
In this regard, I also aim to emphasize the role of the Translation Office in 
transmitting the embassy correspondence and newspaper translations. Since 
nineteenth century the bureaucratic documents were not required to follow the formal 
rules for writing and composing used elsewhere, correspondence coming to the Porte 
from the embassies serve as good examples of “the Ottoman political idiom and 
rhetoric of power” within routine Ottoman bureaucracy.155 Even though there was a 
“codex of representations and formulating argumentations,”156 officials of the 
Foreign Ministry and sometimes Translation Office appear to have been comfortable 
expressing their ideas in the documents they wrote. As the main training center of 
bureaucrats, the Translation Office of the Foreign Ministry was a first stop for all 
documents, where each was inspected before transfer to higher echelons of the 
Sublime Porte. The officials serving in the Foreign Ministry were the men that made 
the decisions. Aware of the importance of their positions as statesmen, they did not 
hesitate to influence directly the politics of the Sublime Porte during the Tanzimat 
                                                        
   155 Maurus Reinskowski, “The State’s Security and the Subject’s Prosperity: Notions of Order in 
Ottoman Bureaucratic Correspondence (19th Century),” p. 195. 
   156 Ibid, p. 197. 
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Era. And as a section filled with most educated and able statesmen of the time, the 
Translation Office helped to promote the discursive hegemony of that bureaucratic 
class on the Ottoman politics. 
 
 
3.1. Monitoring of the European Political Affairs in the Foreign Newspapers  
 
Most of the newspaper clippings and embassy letters arriving at the Foreign 
Ministry via the Translation Office related to internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. 
Still, there was some interest in news that reflected circumstances in Europe and 
these items came to the attention of ambassadors through the well-established 
intelligence network of the Sublime Porte. Related correspondence gives some clues 
about in what ways the Ottoman Empire tried to understand Europe.  
    
 
3.1.1. The Parliamentary Debates in the British Cabinet  
 
I came across two documents that concerned the parliamentary debates in 
England regarding the establishment of a new ministerial cabinet in 1851. It seems 
that the Ottoman statesmen were curious about this kind of developments taking 
place in Europe. In this context, Reshid Pasha was the first bureaucratic official to be 
directly influenced by Europe. He was affected by the Revolution of 1830 and other 
movements of liberalism, which occurred during his tenure as Ambassador to 
England and France. He was in favor of Louis Philippe’s the July monarchy in 
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France and he was engrossed by the election reforms in England.
157
 The documents 
reveal that Ali Pasha as a progenitor of Reshid Pasha continued these interests when 
he took over the latter’s positions. 
     Since 1683, there had been an ongoing conflict between two parties in the 
English Parliament. The ascendency of the house of Stuart family, on the death of 
Oliver Cromwell, instigated a fight between Parliament and the King. The Stuarts 
wanted an absolute monarchy, and in this they were supported by the right-wing, 
Tory party. The opposition, the Whig (Liberal) party wanted to increase the rights of 
the Parliament against the King. That fight lasted until 1689, with the crowning of 
William and Mary (William of Orange and his wife). When William agreed to accept 
the Declaration of Rights in 1689, the Parliament gained more extensive rights.
158
 
Although the Whigs had triumphed over the Tories in this instance, the power 
competition lasted until 1830.
159
 With the liberal air of the Revolution, the power 
passed to the hands of the Whig party, although documents made it clear that the 
conflict was still going on in 1851. According to the Ottoman embassy agent Vinter 
Morpuzo, the British cabinet was working on forming a new ministry which would 
have no majority, but would be under the authority of Lord John Russell (1792–
1878) and Lord Palmerstone (1784–1865). The problem was that the Whig party 
took the example of the right wing French party, Orléanists in the way that both 
supported the constitutional monarchy with limited powers of a king. Aroused as a 
production of French Revolution, the Orléanist were regarded as a threat by the 
Tories. And that legitimacy of the Orléanists above the Whig Cabinet became an 
issue of hot debate between the two opposite parties in the parliament.  Morpuzo 
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   158 Norman Davies, Europe: A History  (London; Pimlico, 1997), pp. 629-631; for a more detailed 
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described how that traditional order of  a French party still had an effect on today 
English Whig party by using a metaphor; “les morts appellent les morts du 
tombeau!”160 (The dead call the dead from the grave). In Paris two months later 
(March 17, 1851), other Ottoman embassy official Rıza reported on the latest 
developments in the British Cabinet. A consequence of the previous problem, the 
British Ministry was still shaken, and the difficulties faced by the opposite parties 
were burdensome. Yet the Whig Party managed to retain power and Rıza estimated 
that it was unlikely that they would lose it soon. Both Lord John Russell and Lord 
Palmerstone, as had been expected, became the politicians who maintained both the 
internal and external policies. Rıza commented that threats to dissolve the House of 
Commons were unpopular, and following that route could in turn further strengthen 
the power of the Whig Party.
161
  
    Both of the writers of these reports, the embassy agents, took on the task of 
vigilance and advocacy of the public diplomacy. They just watched and reported the 
atmosphere with their own analyses. Yet no sign of negotiation was in question. It 
just reveals that the Ottoman Empire was not in a state of oblivion. They wanted to 
be aware of the things going on around the world. As for the echo of the 
developments of the English Parliamentary system, not much could be discerned 
from these documents. It is unclear to what extent the Ottoman officials were 
affected by these liberal movements. Even though it could be said that Meclis-i Vala-
yı Ahkam-ı Adliye (The Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances) and Dar-ı Şura-yı 
Bab-ı Ali (the Deliberative Council of the Sublime Porte) both resembled to the 
parliamentary system of Europe in functioning, they were of a different nature in 
reality.  
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3.1.2. Political Crisis between France and Belgium on the Freedom of Belgian 
 Press 
 
    In May 1856, a political crisis involving the Belgian and French 
Governments was brought to the attention of the Foreign Minister, Fuad Pasha.
162
 In 
the report, the author observed that the Belgian press was waging propaganda against 
the French Government, and that this increased the tension between authorities of the 
two governments. Even though it seemed to be a small scale conflict, Ottoman 
officials had another goal for observing it. After recounting the matter in detail, the 
reporter related the events to the foreign policies of the Ottoman Empire. 
    For a long time, the French Government had been offended by the violent 
language of the Belgian press. The attacks on the French Republic came mostly from 
French refugees who had been welcomed by the Belgian Government. The reporter 
claimed that a sensible and farsighted observer would realize the contradiction 
between the attitude held by the Belgian press and the principle of the neutrality 
which was central to the existence of Belgium as a nation. He was aware of the 
hypocrisy of one group of men in Belgian government, who were hostile to France 
and “laugh up their sleeves at what happens”163 while pretending to regret their 
inability to stop the abuses of the press. The reason for this attitude, according to the 
Ottoman official, was the fact that Belgium was a country of freedom, and its 
constitution did not give the executive the right to punish such behaviors. The other 
group, on the other hand, could not wait to get rid of those refugees, not out of 
                                                        
   162 BOA, HR.TO. ;1174, 36/77. Three dispatches in the report dated on May 2/9//16, 1856. 
   163 Ibid, “ rient sous cape de ce qui se passé.” 
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sympathy for France but for the fear of adverse consequences. However, they too 
were afraid of liberal reaction if Belgium moved the refugees back to France. Before 
the Revolution of the 1830, the King of Belgium-Holland already put all his efforts 
to censor the press and harassed the independency of its Belgian parliament. Yet the 
air of revolution coming from France resulted in the separation of Belgium from 
Holland and the establishment of independent constitutional government.
164
 It is 
obvious that even 26 years after 1830 Revolution, its effects were still vigorous and 
the free Belgium did struggle through its parliament not to return back to these times 
again. Ottoman official had the opportunity to witness it in the parliament.  
    The Ottoman official who made this report then commenced on the power of 
the press in Belgium. He thought that it was the third power in the state after the 
King and the Chambers. He presented a few questions for consideration: How did the 
Belgian Government dare to enter into combat with the press? How did they try to 
reduce its power? His answer was harsh and realistic: “you would better jump in 
head first in the midst of a troop of hungry wolves!” Rather than trying to control the 
Belgian press,
165
 the reporter concluded his argument by noting that such an effort 
would require men of courage and eloquence, and the Belgian state had none. Later 
in 1856, the Ottoman official sent to Fuad Pasha a speech made to the Belgian 
Congress by a M. le Jlalewsky in April of that year. In the speech, le Jlalewsky 
assessed the subject of press conflict in a way related to France, though the real 
interest was in all European powers. He knew that the Emperor’s (French) 
government wished to preserve the best relations with Belgium. He gave the message 
that if the representatives of the Great Powers of Europe would issue their opinion of 
the problem on the freedom of press, the Belgian government would act according to 
                                                        
   164 Hayreddin Nedim Göçen, Vesaik-i Tarihiyye ve Siyasiyye: Belgelerin Dilinden Osmanlı ve 
Avrupa  (Istanbul; Selis Kitaplar, 2008), p. 173. 
   165 Ibid. ; “ Autant voudrait se jeter la tété la premiére au milieu d’une troupe de loupes affamés.” 
63 
 
the majority of the countries. Mr.le Jlalewsky stated that he knew it was a duty of the 
international community to not tolerate a same problem at home in order to 
undermine peace in neighboring states. Thus, the problem between the France and 
Belgium was drawn into the international arena and the Ottoman official also saw 
himself fit to be a part of that debate. 
    The official first evaluated reactions in Belgium toward le Jlalewsky’s 
speech. While some politicians, particularly the Ministers of Justice and Finance, 
insisted on the need to apply law enforcement to the press, another group claimed 
that it would be disgraceful to “sacrifice our liberties to national requirements of a 
foreign sovereign.”166 The reporter criticized the second group by arguing that if a 
country had the right to ask that no one interfered its internal affairs; it also had the 
duty to act in the same way towards its neighbors. The Belgians frequently evoked 
the principles of neutrality. Nevertheless, according to the reporting official, 
neutrality was respectable if serious and sincere. Neutrality of a country should not 
only lead to avoidance of acts of war against other people, but also avoid any 
demonstrations of agitation; whether in the disputes between the nations or in the 
domestic politics of the others. At that point, the official revealed his own intentions, 
deploring the conflict between France and Belgium. He related the ongoing debate 
over the Belgian press to debates over the Eastern Question. On the Eastern 
Question, like the establishment of the Empire in France, Belgium showed the same 
degree of serious demonstrations, he argued. Yet, the reporter assured Fuad Pasha 
that the Turkish Legation in Brussels knew well what to expect in that regard. 
Besides, the malicious role played by the representative of Belgium in Pera, the Duke 
of Brabant, the position he took during the war (probably the Crimean War) and even 
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before against Turkey, and his anti-Turkish stance were known and acknowledged by 
all Belgians. Likewise, the writer recognized that the Belgian government had 
sympathies towards Russia against the French. That was also proved by the marked 
coldness of Duke of Brabant during the (Crimean) war. While the officers of Belgian 
army published provocative writings against the Western powers of the war, they 
showed great favor to the agents of Russia. Concerning all those facts, the official 
became confident that Belgium overlooked the duties of neutrality. For that reason, 
the time came to remind them of their duties, he exclaimed. In the report, the 
Ottoman official gave a series of lessons addressed to the Belgian Government for a 
resolution. He argued that if the system in place did not suit the Belgian authorities, 
they should cease to be neutral however unpleasant that may seem. It would be better 
to reduce the country’s level of importance and be content with small claims. The 
author pointed to Switzerland as a role model in this respect, and predicted that they 
could work, sell, buy, get rich in the way Switzerland did. Hereafter, he assured the 
Belgians, they could debate democracy and aristocracy, the progressive liberalism 
and conservatism as they pleased. In the end he did not abstain from warning them 
that if they continued to interfere in the affair of others, they had to expect the same 
to happen against their own internal politics. Thus the Ottoman official represented 
the Empire as a part of the European system by finding the authority in himself to 
suggest policies that would resolve their problems. The Empire in return obtained the 
intelligence through modern means of network, necessary for understanding and 
competing with the exterior powers. 
    That same official compared the current attitude of Belgium to the “bat” fable 
of La Fontaine. He wrote that whenever they warned politicians of that country about 
the requirements of neutrality, Belgian authorities would assert they were proudly 
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independent. On the other hand, when the neighboring countries raised their voices 
and prepared to act, Belgium clamored that they were neutral. The Belgian 
authorities were like the bat, saying to one group “Look at my wings, I am a bird” 
and to other group “You see my body? I am a mouse.” The Ottoman official was 
unable to understand this hypocrisy. He observed that France was losing patience 
and, if this attitude among the Belgians continued, it would be only a matter of days 
before France would close the borders to the passage of people and goods into 
Belgium. He thought that Belgium would kneel before the French Emperor in the 
end.  
    Moreover, the Ottoman official recounted the latest developments over the 
debates in the Belgian Press. Apparently, a left-wing member of the House of 
Representatives, Mr. Orts, addressed the Ministries of the Government regarding a 
couple of questions on the issue: Should or did the Cabinet respond to the French 
government or any other government in the Congress? Had any other European 
government asked Belgium to propose a constitutional amendment? If such a request 
were made, would the Congress be willing to consent? The Ottoman official 
described how sharp and negative the answers were given to those queries. He 
emphasized the democratic atmosphere in the Congress by pointing to the debates, 
and to the freedom of expression held by the Belgian people. He observed that about 
two thousand people went into the streets under the Belgian flag, and cheered for the 
answers made by the Ministries in the Congress. The Ottoman reporter witnessed 
people on the street freely expressing their reaction to every issue on parliamentary 
politics.  
He revealed that in the end Belgian government had to take steps to change 
the press law to satisfy the claims of France. Because new elections were on the way 
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it seemed the wisest way to give respite to the Cabinet of Brussels until the next 
meeting of the Congress. The Ottoman official concluded his reports by presenting 
his ideas concerning the press debate of Belgium:  
You have the freedom of the press, keep it there if you want, and make use of 
all as you please but for you and your business. When you have made your 
constitution, you have stipulated that the press would be free, completely free; 
this stipulation binds you to each other, people and government, but it cannot 
bind foreign governments and peoples, who have not taken part in your 
contract. Thus; write, print and tackle each other, it is your right and your duty 
to bear it. But nothing gives you this right for France, or Turkey, or any other 
people, and these in turn have no duty to suffer the infamy of your journalists.
167
 
 
    The way the correspondence was transmitted and the evaluation of the crisis 
provided by the Ottoman representative are outstanding evidence that the Ottoman 
Empire made efforts to understand Europe and to generate policies considering the 
exterior developments. There may be additional reasons why the Ottoman official 
paid so much attention to an ongoing debate over press conflict. First, the Ottoman 
Empire continued its close relationship with France after the Crimean War. As the 
document points out, the other powers of Europe were obviously aware of that 
relationship. Russia was the enemy of the both powers at the time and Belgium was 
sympathetic to Russia. For that reason, the political attitude of the Belgian press 
against France in the long term could threaten the Ottoman Empire as well. As the 
Empire took steps in foreign matters together with its allied power, it was no longer 
possible to evade the effects of the problems in Europe. For that reason, the official 
might attempt to warn the Foreign Ministry of the possible dangers. After all, the 
Ottoman Empire also became a political asylum for many Hungarian refuges 
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escaping as a result of the 1848 Revolution. In face of all threats came from Austria 
and Russia, the Empire refused to send them back. While that generosity gained the 
sympathy of France and England who in short time became the allies of the Ottoman 
Empire in the Crimean War, the other powers were quite unpleasant with the 
situation.
168
 In that respect, having experienced a similar case, the Ottoman Empire 
might also be afraid of the growing power of press as that there might come a time 
when the foreign press threatened the integrity of the Empire. 
 
 
3.1.3. The Colonial Aspirations of Britain 
 
Another noteworthy document is dated October, 1857. The Ambassador of 
the Ottoman Empire in London, Constantin Musurus (1851–1885) conveyed a 
message to the Foreign Ministry that from the Foreign Office by Lord Clarendon 
(1800–1870). Clarendon enclosed an announcement, inserted in the London Gazette, 
indicating that Rear Admiral Sir Michael Seymour, commander of Her Majesty’s 
Naval Forces in China, established a blockade of the harbor of River Canton. 
Clarendon specifically requested his message to be brought to the attention of His 
Imperial Majesty Sultan Abd-ül Mecid Han, indicating that he was aware the 
development in China would interest His Majesty.
169
 Up to 1757, when contact with 
foreigners was forbidden, the entrance point for the Empire of China was Canton 
Harbor and Macao Island. Initially, contact evolved around trade affiliations. When 
the trade network was followed by flow of Christian missionaries into China, the 
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Manchu dynasty limited foreign contact and trade to the city of Canton. Until 1842, 
the trade with Europe was carried out by merchants known as “merchants of the 
Emperor.” Europeans had no direct access to Chinese merchants or to authorities.170 
Those circumstances most naturally agitated the European powers that were pursuing 
colonial desires.  
    In 1857, Britain was the biggest sea power and it had claimed many overseas 
colonies since the late 16
th
 or early 17
th
 centuries. On the other hand, the closeness of 
the Ottoman Empire to Britain was still on its pike, and it seems that the British 
Government desired its ally to keep track of its own foreign policies. It is also 
probable that, Britain would like to induce both China and the Ottoman Empire to 
contemplate coordination of overseas policies, and to take steps together with 
Britain. As one important agent of the intelligence network of the Foreign Ministry at 
that period, Constantin Musurus carried out the negotiation policy of Ottoman public 
diplomacy.  
 
 
 
3.1.4. German Unification (1871) and the Anniversary of the Revolution in  
 France 
 
Apart from correspondence relating to items of specific concern, officials of 
the Ottoman Empire wanted to learn of other daily occurrences taking place in 
different parts of Europe. A report, dated February 24, 1851, related to the 
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anniversary commemoration of the Revolution
171
 in Paris (Bastille Day)
172
 and the 
Ottoman official described the atmosphere vividly.  According to him, one thousand 
people from all classes of society attended the ceremonies. Plans for religious 
ceremonies were also made for that day, and opinions regarding a pilgrimage to the 
Bastille were expressed. Many people left bouquets of everlasting flowers in the 
streets. In the morning, Napoleon III began to sell his horses. As could be discerned 
from the description, every little detail going on in Europe, regardless of their 
relatedness to the Ottoman Empire, was brought to the attention of the Foreign 
Ministry. 
The Sublime Porte was also curious about the formation of the German 
Unification, created after the Vienna Congress in 1815 to form an economic union of 
the German-speaking countries of Central Europe, to counterbalance Prussia and 
Austria.
173
 According to Rıza Efendi, official of the Paris Embassy, all the states or 
principalities of the Austrian Empire joined the Unification.
174
 Both Prussia and 
Austria, and additionally Russia, had a major interest in the formation of the 
Unification. Prussia consented, after resisting for a long time, when it realized that 
the smaller German states would not withstand for a long time on their own. The 
creation of the Unification divided France internally but, while maintaining some 
reluctance, France did in the end decided to recognize it through diplomatic policies. 
Berlin then declared that a confirmation by Palmerstone indicated that England 
would follow France in the same way.
175
 Rıza Efendi informed his superior that the 
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Unification hoped to give the rulers of Europe a means to combat the revolts of the 
nationalities and to maintain their Constitutional freedom. Rıza Efendi further 
commented that it was unlikely to expect any German Revolution to evolve in the 
same way French Revolution had. The constitutional reform in Germany seemed 
impossible by any legal means, and the popularity of the President did not seem 
sufficient to overcome the obstacles. He concluded his report by adding that the issue 
of the executive power in the Unification was still a problem to be taken care of. 
    Sometimes, the latest developments in Europe were delivered to the Porte in 
telegram-like reports. Most developments were mentioned only briefly. The 
importance of those news reports lies in the fact that, it demonstrates a steady 
information flow to the Foreign Ministry via the Translation Office. Before, there 
was also flow information which was yet based on irregular and unproductive 
channels. Improvement in the structure of the Foreign Ministry bore a standardized 
bureaucratic system. The sub-section Translation Office as the beginning point for 
high career helped that system to function in a more elaborate way. It appears that 
the Ottoman Empire strove to become a part of Europe by adapting itself to the 
modern means of communication and information network. Each piece of news 
brought, by any means, to the attention of the Foreign Ministry was first passed 
through the chamber of Translation Office. The Ottoman officials of the Foreign 
Ministry as a whole had an urge to be aware of anything happening around the 
world, especially Europe. 
 
 
3.2. Monitoring of the Ottoman Political Affairs in the Foreign Newspapers 
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    During the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire became the target of many 
European powers (Russia, Britain, Austria and France), it had to deal with many 
internal problems instigated mostly by those powers. Most of those problems 
resulted from the effects of the nationalist ideas first triggered by the French 
Revolution and intensified by the later Revolutions of 1830 and 1848 in Europe. In 
that respect, news from the foreign press about events in the Ottoman Empire was 
also of concern. Such events included nationalist riots in the Ottoman Empire—the 
Serbian Revolts of 1804–1813, the Greek Rebellion in 1821, crises in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Montenegro in 1858–1869—the conflicts of certain European 
powers, such as the one occurred between Russia and France over the Holy Places of 
the Empire, the Pan-Slav politics of Russia and its so-called protectorate of the 
Orthodox millet of the Empire. And state policies generated by the European powers 
with the aim of interfering the internal administration of the Ottoman Empire. The 
European news tended to contradict the cordial decisions of the Congress of Vienna 
(1814–15) regarding the integrity and neutrality of the Empire.  
    The Congress of Vienna, hosted by the Austrian statesman Metternich met 
from September 1814 to June 1815. The aim of the Congress was to deal with 
problems stemming from the French Revolutionary Wars (1792–1802), the 
Napoleanic Wars (1803–1815) and the disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire 
(1806). The military campaigns waged by Napoleon Bonaparte, got the attention of 
the other European powers. For that reason, when the Congress was held; delegates 
from Russia, France, Britain, Prussia and Austria as well as some of the smaller 
duchies attended. Each had their own reasons for doing so. The British Empire did 
not want the balance of power in Europe to be destroyed. It was especially afraid that 
Russia and Austria would become more powerful. Austria, similarly, was cautious 
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about the expansion of Prussia and Russia. Though the Ottoman Empire was also 
invited to the Congress its representatives did not attend. According to Davison, it 
was one of the policies of the 19
th
 century Ottoman diplomacy to evade from 
attending the international conferences. The Ottoman statesmen were aware that 
whenever they met with the Great Powers of Europe in a conference the found the 
way in the disguise of reform demands for instance to push their wants on the 
Ottoman Empire. As a gained experience, the Ottoman Empire became faced with 
the interference of its integrity under these demands. As a precaution, the Ottoman 
statesmen were reluctant to attend.
176
   
In the Concert of Europe following the Congress, general decisions were 
made about maintaining the balance of power in Europe, and the integration of the 
Ottoman Empire was also guaranteed in that respect.
177
 Reports about the European 
press on the issues of the Ottoman Empire show the conflict between decisions taken 
in those two gatherings and European politics regarding the Ottoman Empire. As a 
modern device of the 19th century, the European press was the finest instrument to 
check the pulse of the real European public opinion. 
 
 
3.2.1. The Problem of Greece  
 
Documents concerning the monitoring of the European press in its attitude 
toward the Ottoman problems with Greece were also explored. The first group of 
reports in this series related to the Greek Revolt and the issues of Greece. On January 
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14, 1847, a polemic between the British and Greek Governments was reported to the 
Sublime Porte.
178
 It was sent to the Chairman of the Board of the Foreign Ministry 
Mr. J. Coletus by Edmund Lyons (1790–1858), a British diplomat and naval 
commander who had a distinguished career in the Crimean War. According to 
Lyons, the Athenian Ministerial Newspaper Zephyr alleged that there would be an 
assassination attempt by the Ottoman Empire against the Athenian Minister. On the 
instructions of Palmerstone, Lyons communicated with General Travellas (?) on the 
issue and as the patronage and protection of the newspaper belonged to that Mr. 
Coletus, Lyons also informed him of the great surprise this news was to Her 
Majesty’s Government. Coletus, in a prior letter to Lyons, had implied that British 
newspapers were the first to publish this news. In reaction, Lyons defended his 
government in his report. He concluded that not a single English newspaper would 
threaten a Foreign Minister in London with assassination. When Mahmud II sent 
Ottoman and Egyptian forces to Greece to suppress the rebels in 1827, Britain was 
forced to sign the London Treaty with Russia and France in the same year. This 
treaty assured joint intervention if either the Ottoman Empire or Russia refused to 
reconcile. After the defeat of Muhammed Ali’s forces in Navarino, the Ottoman 
Empire lost control of Greece.
179
 Britain became a supporter of the independent 
Greece from that point. According to Lyons, thinking of those policies of Britain 
towards the Empire, it was quite natural for the British Government to be interested 
in “the welfare of a Kingdom which it so materially contributed to bring into 
existence.”180 For that reason, Her Majesty’s Government warned that the Greek 
Government could not fail to take proper measures on such an occasion. Otherwise it 
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might give rise to disagreeable questions between the Government of Greece and the 
British Government. Lyons insisted that the false news was not of English origin, and 
he requested the demands of Her Majesty’s Government be taken seriously. One 
newspaper article created an international conflict out of which Britain was able to 
have a word regarding Ottoman and Greek internal politics.  
    Another report concerned an article published in the Greek journals 
l’Independant and l’Elpis about the activities of a person, Lear Zacha in 1856. The 
legation of Athens, G. Cornemenos, denounced that, in recent days the Hellenic press 
threw itself into a view where the Excellency (Fuad Pacha) would not have expected 
to see any time soon, after especially the lessons that the Allied troops had given.
181
 
According to the newspapers, Lear Zacha had tried to organize in the last May a 
band opening the doors to prisoners, yet it seemed that the conspiracy was prevented 
and it failed to be set. For Cornemenos, the problem was that the articles showed a 
spirit too fitted and flattering and made clear the dreams which Greece had never 
ceased to deceive.
182
 That attitude of the articles, published in different organs of the 
press, also aroused the attention of the Ministers of France and England, about which 
Cornemenos implied that they had to be on attention. Notwithstanding the fact that 
those newspapers were not actually hostile to the present Ministry, he advised to be 
precautious about the rumor. As the Hellenic authorities predicted, if that plot 
became successful, 150 prisoners kept there would be thrown in robbery and they 
would produce the most disastrous problems against the inhabitants of the border 
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provinces of the Empire. To prevent any possibility of those plots, Preza Beg (?) 
advised the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece to ordain the removal of the 
frontiers of suspected men like Zacha. And the authority in charge, Mr. Pottis, 
promised to do what was required of.  
    In another case, the consulate of the Sublime Porte in Toscana found some 
news serious enough to report it immediately to His Highness, Ali Pasha. In the 
morning of December 7 1861, receptions were held both in Toscana and Turin in 
honor of Garibaldi’s birthday. Garibaldi did not attend the ceremonies as expected 
but continued on his journey to Caprera, after meeting one of his aides-de-camp, a 
Greek conspiratorial exile. That Greek started a rumor that, within thirty days, 
Garibaldi would issue to him and his adherents a call to arms for active duty. When 
the affairs of Italy were settled, he would set off against the Ottoman Empire and the 
Imperial Government. For that reason, the consulate requested that the Porte take 
precautionary measures against a possible intervention.
183
  
 
 
3.2.2. The Desires of Russia 
 
The Ottoman Empire was also quite interested in the ongoing internal debates 
among the big powers of Europe. The main concerns were the Pan-Slavic politics of 
Russia and its desire to get close to the Orthodox millet, Eastern politics of each 
power (Russia, Hungary, France, England, etc.), the problem of Principalities 
(Moldavia-Wallachia), disputes over Holy Places and nationalist movements in the 
provinces. The Foreign Ministry meticulously followed European policies regarding 
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the Empire. For that reason, most of the documents in the archive that are related to 
these problems contain considerable detail.  
    Many of the documents were about the various policies of thee European 
powers regarding the issues of the Ottoman Empire. For example, a news item taken 
from the English newspaper The Times, dated April 12, 1853 describes the monetary 
fluctuations in the stock exchanges of Paris and relates this to the latest news coming 
from the East. The French Government panicked, and quickly sent Admiral Pausse 
with his squadron to the Levant. Details of the news that created the panic were not 
clearly indicated however. By implication, the problem concerned was the moves 
made by the Emperor of Russia against the Ottoman Empire. The Times article 
described the policies as obviously exaggerated, not giving value to the possibility 
that Russia would break its engagements with the other powers of Europe. 
Unfortunately, the coming of the Crimean War proved that nothing about Russian 
desires were exaggerated. The newspaper also foresaw the possible alliances of the 
Ottoman Empire with the other powers against Russia, if such a conflict occurred 
between them. The reason given was that the internal weakness of the Empire would 
not permit it to attack Russia directly. The newspaper also mentioned reasons for 
collaboration between Austria and Russia. The Ottoman official wrote that the 
relation between Austrian Count Leiningen
184
 and Russian Prince Metchnikoff was 
not actually an arrangement between Courts of Vienna and St. Petersburg, It was 
rather owing to fears of Russia among Austrians. The intervention of Russia in the 
affairs of Montenegro made Metchnikoff get close to Russia. The newspaper 
generated a reaction to these policies by alleging that in reality all these rumors were 
exaggerated by the Russian press. Russia was not at all in a state of preparation for a 
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companion, Prince Metchnikoff actually had no authority to order Russian army in 
motion or order a fleet to leave Sevastopol. By adding that Austria and France 
became anxious about those rumors, the English newspaper The Times gave the 
message that it was the one big power that would generate solutions for those 
problems. According to the news, the British Government would be ready to 
combine its influence and diplomatic efforts with the French Government, on the 
matter of Holy Places. It concluded by warning the other powers of Europe about 
their mistakes in supporting Russia and Austria. The reason was that these two 
powers had too much interest in the border provinces of the Ottoman Empire to share 
them with the other European powers.
185
 That The Times article revealed the great 
importance of the press as a means to transmit and manipulate the policy making 
activities of governments. Apparently, the article predetermined what was coming 
up. Examining each report with much detail, it is probable that the Empire was also 
affected by the articles while defining its own policies. 
    In 1860 several issues of a Russian newspaper, Gazette Russienne, translated 
thoroughly by the Translation Office and analyzed by the Foreign Ministry. 
Disappointed by the Crimean War (1853–1856), Russia intended to take new actions 
against the Ottoman Empire. The issue of May 25 offers a good example of the 
propaganda for those policies. According to the article, Prince Metchnikoff 
declaimed passionately that Russia would not sulk but it would collect. His manifesto 
was addressed to Europe, when Russia after the war seemed to deal with its own 
affairs at the expense of having a passive attitude in the political events of Europe. 
The article explained what the Prince meant by crying: “Russia will collect!” It 
expounded on the idea that Russia was still resolute regarding its plans in the East. 
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After resting for a while it would advance in its moves. The article also came up with 
a bold idea that, the old conflict over the Holy Places between France and Russia 
made them get close to each other. It said that the dispute between Latin and Greek 
Christians in Jerusalem became a bone of connection between France and Russia, 
both of whom followed zeal equal to the Christian population of the Ottoman 
Empire. Referring to the decision of the Paris Conference (1856) regarding the 
immunity of Turkey in its internal affairs, Russia expressed annoyance that the fate 
of Christians was left to the arbitrary will of the Sultan. Though the Article 2 made it 
clear that any violation of that draft would be considered a “casus belli’, the Gazette 
Russienne article supported the idea of Russian interference.
186
 In that way, the 
article tried to justify the mischief-making policies of its government, something of 
which the Ottoman Empire became well aware.  
 
 
3.2.3. The Issue of Principalities and the Revolts in the Provinces 
 
The Ottoman Empire had to be quite sensitive to questions regarding the 
Principalities, Moldavia-Wallachia. Although The Paris Peace Conference (1856) 
kept the Empire safe from open attack, it did not conceal the bad intentions of the 
Great powers over the Ottoman lands. The first assault came from the Principalities 
where, with the provocations of Russia, a group of residents tried to spark the idea of 
Romanian nationality. It was opposed by Britain and having a similar system of 
monarchy Austria also felt itself under threat. Still, according to the Treaty of Paris, a 
referendum, independent constitutions and national assembly were already provided. 
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Furthermore, while Moldavia and Wallachia were still under the nominal suzerainty 
of the Ottoman Empire, the above-mentioned developments would function under 
the supervision of the other powers, France, England, Russia, Austria and later Italy. 
After some debate, an agreement was reached between the Ottoman Empire and the 
other powers, to reconcile on a single, united region of Moldavia and Wallachia with 
the appointment of the boyar Alexander Cuza (1820–1873) as the prince of both 
Principalities.
187
 Despite the fact that the Ottoman Empire had nominal rule over the 
Principalities, there must have been a feeling of resentment that remained as a result 
of the reality that the European powers still had a say in the internal affairs of the 
Ottoman Empire. The issue of l’Ost-Deutsch Post from August 1, 1864 brought to 
the attention of the Sublime Porte.
188
 The importance of the news in it lays in the 
manner in which it distorted the attitude of the Empire over the issue. It drew a 
picture suggesting that the Porte would be happy to reconcile with Alexander Cuza. 
Since the Empire was so happy, the authorities saw no need to care about the number 
of voters who elect the House of members. The Ottoman officials of the Foreign 
Ministry probably realized the mischief in the language of the article as it sharpened 
its tone. The main argument implied was that, owing to a lack of interest, the Empire 
deserved that treatment of intervention. It is not clear what reaction the Sublime 
Porte or the Foreign Ministry made to those malicious charges. It is perhaps, the 
officials made some inquiries and as a requirement of advocacy wanted to warn the 
Porte about the hostile attitudes and be cautious in the diplomatic ground against its 
enemies. 
    From the very beginning of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire had to deal 
with nationalist rebellions in the provinces. The Greek riots in 1821 and the Serbian 
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revolt in 1804–1813 became serious headaches for the Empire. While the debates 
over the union of the Principalities came to a resolution (to some degree), problems 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina resulting from the restlessness of the population and 
exterior provocations took time to settle down. Bosnia and Herzegovina became the 
subject of international conflict with, as might be predicted, Russia involved on 
behalf of Serbia. From the start, the large landowners did not obey the Tanzimat 
Reforms because they called for a direct tax collection system and stricter inspection 
by the government and so were against their own economic interests. As a result, the 
large landowners were easy targets of agitation, especially by Russia. Not only did 
they did not comply with the direct tax collection, they also did not contribute their 
proper share to the treasury. Muslims were left aside as their voice was not heard. 
Britain, France and proponents of Pan-Slavism instigated revolts between 1858 and 
1861 that caused much trouble to the Empire.
189
 The revolts were suppressed during 
the governorship of Omer Lutfi Pasha (1860–61), but unfortunately this remained an 
international problem and the crisis lasted till the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Fed up 
with the demands of the tax collectors, the peasants of Bosnia-Herzegovina revolted 
one more time in 1874. As a result, the courts of Vienna, Berlin and St. Petersburg 
came to an agreement, issued as a dispatch known as the Andrassy Note as it was 
prepared by Count Julius Andrassy, then Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary. The 
dispatch was an ultimatum presented to the Porte regarding its promises over Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
190
 The real intent, though, was to pave the way for foreign intervention 
in Ottoman affairs. The authorities at the Porte had the wit to understand the purpose 
of the so-called efforts made by the Great Powers of Europe. Proof of it was some 
reports sent to the Translation Office for forwarding to the necessary authorities. 
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Each publication that came up in the reports was about the intervention policies of 
Europe.  
    A report from the Embassy, addressed to Foreign Minister Rashid Pasha in 
1873, was about the newspaper Jagblett. It was sent as a simple information item, yet 
it was written that the content was composed of “hypothetically powerful 
arguments.”191 It brought the Vienna World Exhibition, in 1873, to the attention of 
the Empire. In this exhibition the policies of each power could be deduced. The 
repeated visits of Emperor Francis Joseph to St. Petersburg caused suspicions in 
Istanbul: the only reason could be the political aims of the Eastern policy, as the 
Andrassy Note made clear the following year. Sultan cancelled his visit to the 
exhibition. According to the article, the rumors were that the Sultan was afraid of the 
cholera epidemics. However, considering that Khedive Ismail Pasha also cancelled 
his trip to Vienna following the decision of His Majesty, it became unequivocal that 
a diplomatic means was assumed to be a reaction or a precaution. The submissive 
attitude of the Khedive was related to the hopelessness of regaining what his 
predecessor, Khedive Mehemmed Ali, had lost years ago. The meaning of the 
Andrassy Note was also hinted at in the article. Even though the European powers 
were aware that Pan-Slav policies would not gain them anything in the East, still the 
policies of Count Andrassy must be evaluated carefully. As the Ottoman Embassy 
Official who submitted that report emphasized the hypothetically powerful 
arguments, those to whom it was addressed must also have shown the necessary 
awareness of developments. 
    Russian newspapers had also a hostile attitude towards the Ottoman Empire. 
Press Office of the Foreign Ministry sent the news published in Golos dated August 
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25, 1875, to the Translation Office to be translated. This brings out another function 
of the Translation Office: Russian language translation. Knowledge of French by 
Ottoman officials, as the only foreign language needed for diplomatic 
correspondence at the time, was not the sole language the Translation officials were 
settled with. It is interesting to realize in that respect that there were people capable 
in other languages, such as Russian. The concerned article must have come to the 
attention of the Porte and Mahmud Nedim Pasha, twice Grand Vizier of the Ottoman 
Empire (1871–1872 and 1875–1876).192 The reason was that the article implied a 
change of Grand Vizierate would be to the benefit of the Empire. In addition to the 
problems of the provinces and especially Bosnia-Herzegovina, the article alleged that 
there would be polarization between England and with its allies on one side and 
Russia on the other. Even with a conclusion that Russia should not meddle with the 
natural course of the politics in the Ottoman Empire, it was daunting for the Empire 
to consider the possible consequences of its political decisions. The news article 
suggests that the Empire was free to choose between the offer made by Russia and 
the humiliation caused by the Western Powers. Even if the Porte made the right 
decision (!), still it would not be enough. Only when the Porte replaced the Grand 
Vizier Serasker Hussein Avni Pasha (1874–1875) with someone close to Russian 
politics, would Baron Werther, the Ambassador of Germany to the Ottoman Empire, 
would act in the way to lower down the tension between the Porte and Russia. The 
sympathy of Mahmud Nedim Pasha towards the policies of Russia is a known fact in 
the history. The officials sending that report either were acting according to his 
instructions or else they shared his same feelings about Russia.  
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3.2.4. Economy, Trade, Communication and Transportation 
 
The pattern of economic relations between the Ottoman Empire and Europe 
changed during the 19th century. New means of communication and interaction led 
to wider opportunities to maintain contact with Europe for economic reasons. 
Economic interactions increased and trade companies mostly replaced the individual 
merchants. Through the 19
th
 century, inventions such as steamships and railroads 
made transportation across long distances much easier. Increasing use of foreign 
currencies in the Empire created a more complicated financial system. These 
developments in the commercial and financial networks were monitored closely by 
Ottoman officials, and specific events relating to the commercial affairs debated in 
the European Press were reported back to the Empire.  
    In 1874, some newspapers in Vienna covered news of the trade relations 
between the Ottoman Empire and Spain. This coverage was directly reported by the 
Translation Office, as there was no translation made from another source.
193
 
According to the note, the Ottoman shipmaster Faik Beg would be expecting receipt 
of 700 pounds in the Kadikas Harbor (Kathikas in Cyprus) to buy a load of coal from 
Spain. For that reason, he requested the amount to be paid by the Ottoman Imperial 
Bank (Banka-ı Osmani).  
    The building of the railroads became a springboard for the transportation and 
commercial transaction within and beyond the Ottoman Empire. The first plans were 
made soon after the Crimean War, though laying track over long distances was not 
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completed until the reign of Abdulhamit II (1876–1909).194 The reckless 
expenditures of Abdülaziz (1861–1876) damaged the Imperial budget needed for that 
investment. The European world, too, was concerned that economic interests in the 
Empire, as in all other matters, would create opportunities to meddle with its affairs. 
In 1875, both the Russian newspaper Golos and Belgian Independence Belge made 
the harmful effects of the Sultan’s expenses on state budget and on the building of 
railroads the subject of their criticism.
195
 Golos debated whether the Sultan would 
give up some part of his immense property to create a balanced budget. 
Independence Belge, in a contradictory manner to the stance of Golos, argued that 
the deficit in the financial budget would not blemish the image of the Sultan. For the 
business carried out by the Empire and Austria-Hungary regarding the railroads, the 
Imperial Ottoman Bank (Banka-ı Osmani) was not able to meet the expenses. In 
addition to taking measures to decrease the expenses, the Sultan became angry and 
insisted on payment of the expenditures. The article suggested that the luxuries of the 
Imperial Harem be cut down. The officials assigned to inspect and translate these 
documents just pursued the vigilance policy and maintained their neutrality. The 
Foreign Ministry, in that way became aware of the assessments in the articles, both 
the poor financial situation and also the image of the private life of the Sultan. 
 
 
3.2.5. The Individual Cases 
 
The problems created by foreign citizens visiting or living within the Ottoman 
Empire were obviously troublesome for the Sublime Porte. A few, such as the 
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murder of the Dixon family, US citizens, in the Ottoman city of Jaffa, and the 
imprisonment of an Austrian journalist by Ottoman officials were brought to the 
attention of the Foreign Ministry. Both events included both press activity and legal 
issues. In 1858, the Resident Minister of the United States of America, James 
Mirillians, addressed a report to the Ottoman Foreign Minister, Fuad Pasha (1814–
1868).
196
 He was annoyed about news carried in the Journal Constantinople 
regarding the murder of Mr. Dixon’s family, US citizens residing in Jaffa. According 
to the news, three of the murderers were released on government order. As the 
outrageous nature of the killing was obvious, the author did not understand the 
injustice of the decision. Afraid that language in the article would lead to 
provocations in US, he warned about the possible harmful consequences.  
   The second instance involved a report asking a favor of the Sublime Porte.
197
 
An employee of the Austrian newspaper Marod Nilesti (?), one Mr. Haukmann, was 
imprisoned in the war of Trebinje (Trebin Savaşı). The owner of the newspaper 
demanded Haukmann’s protection on behalf of the Austrian envoys to the Ottoman 
Empire. Unfortunately, another report following it shows that the envoy abandoned 
his claim of protecting and releasing the journalist as he understood that he was not 
of a trustworthy character. The official wanted to warn the Foreign Ministry to be 
aware of that situation. 
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3.3. Conclusion 
 
 From the adoption of Ottoman Grand Strategy
198
 in the 16
th
 century to the 
intelligence network of 19
th
, the nature of intelligence-gathering changed 
remarkably. Suleiman the Magnificent initiated his Grand Strategy with a 
universalist vision. As much as events of the 19
th
 century, his attempts in that 
direction helped the Ottoman Empire to take a place in the European system by “the 
elaboration of a foreign policy and propaganda based partly on knowledge acquired 
through the channels of Ottoman intelligence gathering.”199 Yet, the means and ways 
of intelligence gathering were transformed in this time. Sixteenth-century methods 
were not hard to implement and they were not so complex in nature. Nor, 
significantly, was there much intensified foreign contact with Europe, particularly 
compared to the 19
th
 century diplomatic atmosphere.  
 On the other hand, the 19
th
 century Ottoman Empire required intricate foreign 
relations which meant many internal problems that threatened the integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire. For these reasons, the Sublime Porte had to develop an elaborate 
bureaucratic system and modern intelligence network that was unlike the ways of 
knowledge-gathering of the 16
th
 century. Monitoring the European press through 
Ottoman agents, representatives, and ambassadors was fundamental to keeping pace 
with Europe. Both the European political agendas and the news distorting/reflecting 
the problems of the Ottoman Empire aroused the interests of the bureaucrats in the 
same way. 
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 Translation Office became, in this respect, the most helpful yet invisible 
channel between the embassy agents and the Foreign Ministry. All the documents 
found in the Translation Office archive about the monitoring were addressed to the 
Foreign Ministry. However, Ottoman statesmen attuned themselves in every aspect 
to the European conduct of diplomacy. Use of the international language of the time, 
French was also wholly adopted by them. Most of the official correspondences to the 
Sublime Porte were in French in that respect. That’s why the reports first came to the 
Translation Office and their copies were kept there. As the language center which 
employed the educated state officials, the Translation Office became an 
indispensable back kitchen of the Foreign Ministry. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
FOREIGN NEWSPAPERS AND THE CONDUCT OF THE 
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
 
 
             One of the most important tools in the implementation of Ottoman foreign 
policy was the adoption of public diplomacy. During the 19
th
 century, there were 
various means available. In addition to maintenance of the balancing policy between 
the European powers, they included participation in international meetings, the 
Sultan’s courtesy visits to other countries, and the use of public opinion (which, 
according to Davison, was used “as an excuse” to cope with the European 
powers).
200
 Manipulation of public opinion in other countries through the press 
became one of the most important tools of the Ottoman Empire in foreign 
relations.
201
 In the early 19
th
 century, the use of public diplomacy in Europe was the 
responsibility of the Ottoman representatives abroad. As diplomats engaging in 
public relations, the Ottoman representatives frequently reported on the agenda of the 
European country in which they resided, by advocacy stated their ideas on certain 
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problems and became the channel between the Ottoman Empire and its European 
counterparts. This last duty surpassed the others in importance.
202
 Influencing public 
opinion by different means was the explicit policy of Reshid Pasha during his tenure 
as Foreign Minister and Grand Vizier. Realizing that it was not acceptable to have 
only one embassy, in Paris, to control and influence the European press, Reshid 
Pasha promoted the reestablishment of embassies in Vienna, Berlin and St. 
Petersburg 1830s onward. He also made sure bureaucrats at the Ottoman Embassies 
in Europe knew how to do this. His incentive to breed well-educated embassy 
officials capable of generating public diplomacy attained its goal in a short time. 
London Ambassador Constantin Musurus (1851–1885) is a good example for that. 
He arranged a wide-scale campaign against the malicious policies of certain British 
newspapers. Not satisfied with barely contradicting the news, Musurus also 
published many articles and books to fight against the bad propaganda.
203
 To 
mobilize against the European newspapers, for instance, Reshid Pasha also ordered 
many French language copies of the official newspaper Takvim-i Vekayi to be 
provided to different regions of Europe. In that way, he was able to announce the 
reform attempts he was implementing to the European public.
204
  
Henceforward, the Ottoman Empire followed many strategies to influence 
public opinion through the European press more frequently. As the vigilance and 
advocacy policies had already been the main use Ottoman officials, negotiation 
policy was became indispensable over the others. Negotiation techniques of public 
diplomacy included giving subsidies to the newspapers, buying journalist to write in 
their favor, licensing, censorship, persuasion, legal action and honoring with medals. 
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During the reign of Abdülmecid, it was quite common to prohibit the entrance of 
certain publications. Sometimes with the order of the Sultan the foreign post offices 
prevented the circulation of these publications.
205
 While the diplomats and 
representatives of the Ottoman Empire became the primary channel for 
implementing the public diplomacy by the order of Foreign Ministry, the Translation 
Office was the second most important channel for transmitting that intelligence to the 
attention of the Foreign Ministry which in that way more easily held the track on the 
flow of information. That network around these offices accelerated the process of 
policy making of the Sublime Porte and keeping up in tune with the pace of events in 
Europe.  
In this chapter, I investigate the process of public diplomacy developed as 
part of the Tanzimat Foreign Ministry. I also explain the reasons that necessitated the 
use of public diplomacy in the international arena. Second, I illustrate the ways of 
public diplomacy adopted by the Foreign Ministry and its agents that serving these 
ends. Some policies were much easier to apply such as persuasion strategies, 
financial aids and awarding of medals. Others, like the prevention diplomacies such 
as prohibitions and censorship efforts, and legal action were not as easy to carry out; 
they could cause conflictions between the European governments and Ottoman 
authorities. Yet they were quite effective in their results on behalf of the Ottoman 
image if propagated successfully. By speaking about all these apparatus, I stress the 
flexible and multifaceted nature of the Ottoman public diplomacy. The Sublime 
Porte formed the axis around which its agents and journalists asserted a fluid and 
complex relationship. Lastly, I emphasize the role of the Translation Office and 
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Ottoman embassies as the main channels of public diplomacy and foreign 
correspondence.  
The Ottoman Empire began to pursue policies of public diplomacy in Europe 
as early as the 1840s. Reshid Pasha was well aware of the importance played by the 
intelligence network in his diplomatic dealings with Europe. He knew that public 
diplomacy was pursued through “actions, relationships, images and words.”206 
Indoctrinated by his reasoning and foresight, Ottoman representatives and hired 
foreign agents abroad acknowledged the need to assert the Ottoman identity and 
legitimize its power. For instance, a report sent to the Porte on April 30, 1846 by Mr. 
Fokes
207
, an Ottoman agent in Paris, laid out the advocacy of a plan for a project 
concerning European newspapers that would be followed by the Sublime Porte (Bab-
ı Alî) for many years after.208 Using the French press as a model, Fokes manifested 
the intervention and prevention strategies the Sublime Porte was to adopt to control 
the European newspapers in its favor.  
Fokes showed the ways that the French press asserted its hostility to the 
Ottoman Empire. He evaluated the reasons why it became so. His evaluation covered 
an implicit criticism against the deficiencies of the policies propagated by the 
Sublime Porte. According to the document, French newspapers had no 
correspondents in the Empire at the time. That’s why the Ottoman Empire missed the 
chance of enticing the press companies just for two dollars of a line, as the British 
Government often applied to the foreign correspondences working in its country. The 
bold argument of the Ottoman representative was that the official’s lack of interest in 
the power wielded by foreign newspapers created problems for the Empire. He 
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thought that the foreign press had a considerable amount of impact on the internal 
affairs of the Ottoman Empire. His estimation was that the articles published by 
French newspapers and journals led to the Greek Revolution in 1821 and encouraged 
Mehemmet Ali (1805–1848) to revolt against his legitimate sovereign; they would 
stir up problems in the future with Syria and with the rayas (reaya), i.e. the Christian 
population in the provinces. During the 19
th
 century, each government in Europe 
sought to have the good opinion of both their country and foreign powers. The 
Ottoman Empire failed to join the trend in time and so faced a propaganda war 
waged against its integrity. Fokes called for generating a public diplomacy of 
intervention in the foreign press.  
Developments taking place in the Ottoman Empire attracted the curiosity of 
the European population, Fokes argued. Organizing a service to distribute 
information would be the best way to counter the negative representation of the 
Ottoman Empire in foreign newspapers; it would be without extra expense, as well. 
To create such network, Fokes proposed to hire two influential journalists. Mr. 
Soguer and Mr. Frédéric Lacroix would work in both the Ottoman Empire and 
abroad to counter the ill will of the European press. They would show the European 
powers how the Ottoman Empire took steps for its own development and strove to 
maintain its independence. Without this, Mr. Fokes claimed, European newspapers 
would continue to distort facts and even invent malicious news if necessary. Thus, 
the Ottoman Empire could respond to the power of foreign newspapers by making 
use of them on its own behalf. It is almost certain that the Ottoman officials in the 
Foreign Ministry agreed as Soguer and Lacroix were hired and started publishing. 
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Mr. Soguer wrote articles for Le Journal de Constantinople, published in 
Turkey, while Mr. Lacroix
209
 became editor-in-chief of Guide du Voyageur a 
Constantinople (1839) and a main contributor to the important Paris newspapers. Mr. 
Lacroix used all his connections for the Ottoman legitimatization. As well as Journal 
du Peuple, publications such as La Journal Des Debats, La Presse, La Siécle, 
L’Epoque, Le Constitutionnel, La Démonstre Pacifique, Revue des deux Mondes and 
Revue de l’Orient benefited from Lacroix’s expertise in the affairs of the Ottoman 
Empire. All of these newspapers carried articles about all issues relevant to the 
Ottoman Empire: history, literature, the condition of the men, and the progress of 
reform attempts. The articles portrayed a true image of the Empire that asserted the 
strength through which the welfare of the population would be safe-guarded. 
Additionally, European powers would find it difficult to create reasonable excuses to 
interfere with the internal problems of the Ottoman Empire. That process of placing 
articles was mainly carried out by Lacroix and. Soguer; the former would be 
informed of subjects to cover by the authorities and transmit the orders to the latter. 
Soguer would then distribute them to certain European newspapers. That detailed 
report of Fokes which was in short time promulgated as a public diplomacy of the 
Foreign Ministry appears to be one of the very first and best examples serving as a 
representative agenda for the Ottoman foreign diplomacy. 
Public diplomacy conducted by the Ottoman Empire through the European 
press in the 1840s was managed by the embassy officials and hired agents 
responsible for protecting the image of the Empire abroad. In the following decades, 
official documents suggest, the Sublime Porte further advanced its intervention 
policies à propos the foreign press. While representatives of the Ottoman embassies 
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in Europe undertook the major responsibility for the intelligence network by 
gathering the news around Europe, the Translation Office of the Foreign Ministry 
became the second stop through which the reports about foreign newspapers 
distributed to the necessary places of the Foreign Ministry in a format ready to be 
read and evaluated. Since that was the second channel for the foreign bureaucratic 
network its importance, not only as the place for translation but also as the main 
center of education about foreign diplomacy, each report first came under the 
supervision of the Translation Office. Thus, the Translation Office became 
instrumental in helping the functioning system of the newspaper propaganda waged 
by the Foreign Ministry through its agents in Europe.  
 
 
4.1. Persuasion Policies 
 
One policy technique frequently used to control the content of foreign 
newspapers was persuasion. Rather than taking harsh measures, the Sublime Porte 
appointed Ottoman officials and agents as mediators to reconcile with the hostile 
newspapers, or articles, or editors in the first place. According to Godkin, getting 
what you want without causing conflict is also an art of diplomacy.
210
 At the first 
level of its public diplomacy, the agents of Foreign Ministry tried to achieve that. As 
a reference, the report from the Ottoman embassy in Athens dated December 2, 1856 
protested the malicious news of l’Esperiance, a Greek newspaper.211 An article 
alleged that the Ottoman Empire would be unable to replace the Albanian troops, 
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deployed at the frontiers with the regular Ottoman troops to suppress looting. The 
Ottoman official in Athens was baffled by this news since Mr. Comnenos, of the 
Imperial Legation had recently received a message from Fuad Pasha that declared the 
Sultan would never fail to fulfill his commitment. Suppression of the brigandage 
would be executed in a short time. Even so, publishing that kind of news calumny of 
that newspaper. Observing the diplomatic protocols of Europe, Comnenos was aware 
that a plain statement and refutation would not be enough to assert the stance and 
power of the Ottoman Empire. Despite the explanation made by Fuad Pasha, the 
Ottoman representative believed he needed to protest the bad faith shown by the 
newspaper. He convinced Mr. Prangabe, possibly the editor of l’Esperiance to stand 
aside Moniteur Grec, the official newspaper of Athens by abandoning its policies and 
following on the way of that official newspaper. In that way, l’Esperiance would 
prove its frankness towards the Ottoman Empire and the Sultan. Thus the Foreign 
Ministry would save the image and power of the Ottoman Empire. 
Likewise, the careless language used in some Parisian newspapers against 
measures taken by the Ottoman Ministry of Finance was covered by a report dated 
October 9, 1875.
212
 The Ottoman embassy agent in Paris informed the Foreign 
Ministry that he negotiated with many of the significant journalists working in these 
newspapers and won their hearts in that way.
213
 He explained to them the reasons 
why the Ottoman Empire took the measures they had. The representative also 
engaged in many activities that he believed would to gain the support of the 
newspapers. As a fruit of these efforts, journalists promised to be friendly towards 
the policies of the Sublime Porte. A similar case, reported on December 3, 1874, 
informed the Porte about the malicious writings of Mr. Aneyh, the editor in chief of 
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Progress d’Orient. The journalist was propagandizing against the Sublime Porte and 
the character of the Grand Vizier (Sadrazam). The Foreign Ministry requested that 
the Ottoman Embassy in London dissuade Mr. Aneyh of his opinions by reaching an 
understanding through conversant 
 
 
4.2. Financial Aids 
 
Sometimes diplomatic methods of persuasion were not enough to suppress or 
soften the anti-Ottoman propaganda of the foreign newspapers. The power of the 
press was acknowledged everywhere in Europe and competition was encouraged by 
means of awards and rewards. The spread of knowledge was not always maintained 
through ethical journalism and factual reporting. Distortion of the reality, defamation 
policies and the invention of fictitious realities became wide-spread, encouraged by 
financial aids. Whenever attempts to reconcile with the newspapers/their editors fell 
short, the Sublime Porte also appealed to financial means to win over a newspaper. 
This financial support would be distributed to the editor of the newspaper and the 
journalist. For instance, a letter dated August 12, 1853 and sent to the Porte 
demanded the appropriate salary be paid to the journalist and agent Mr. de Chaun 
(Şan?), for services rendered.214 In addition, the letter also asked that expenditures de 
Chaun had made while gathering news favorable to the Ottoman Empire for foreign 
newspapers be covered. In other cases, a newspaper (for example, the Courrier de 
Paris) received an annual payment to present a stable and consistent policy towards 
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the Ottoman Government.
215
 A report from the Paris representative proved how well 
and effective the policy of financial aid proved. Dated December 11, 1867 the report 
described about a plan submitted by Eugène Rolland, the director of the Paris 
newspaper Le Messager.
216
 Fuad Pasha (1814–1868) had asked him to create an 
agency to serve the press in Paris. The instructions by the Foreign Ministry were 
already given for the facilities of the agency for controlling and monitoring the 
European press and especially on the matters concerning Russian-Ottoman relations; 
a rationale was expected on these matters by the Sublime Porte.  For the assignment, 
25,000 francs were to be paid by the Imperial Ottoman Bank (Banka-yı Osmanî) in 
Paris. On learning the price, Rolland expressed his willingness to report on public 
opinions that would be useful and favorable to the Ottoman Empire. In consequence, 
he submitted a plan to defend the interests of the Imperial Government in most 
organs of the French newspapers. 
The Foreign Ministry of the Sublime Porte was arbitrary stipulator of the 
prices to establish a network for its public diplomacy. Sometimes, the journalists 
interested in agitation set the price of the favor they expected. A dispatch sent from 
the Ottoman Embassy in Vienna on January 25, 1872 noted that La Gazette de 
Dentranje previously produced articles in favor of the Ottoman Government. 
However, it seems that the favor was not acknowledged by the Sublime Porte and 
that annoyed the editor in chief of the newspaper. In order to maintain the desired 
performance, the editor demanded a financial contribution. He believed that this aid 
would foster the pro-Ottoman attitude of the newspaper in Eastern affairs. The 
representative sent his dispatch requesting action by the Foreign Ministry to be in 
remuneration for his services.  
                                                        
   215 BOA, HR.TO .; 1934, 429/25. The report dated on May 5, 1858 and the reporter demanded the 
proper amount of money to be annually paid to Courriere de Paris for its assignments. 
   216 BOA, HR.TO. ; 442, 495/23. 
98 
 
In the early decades of the 19
th
 century, the financial assistance was 
sometimes distributed as payment to underwrite the journals. This way of public 
diplomacy actually killed two birds with one stone. Ottoman authorities provided the 
newspapers with the necessary support and at the same time the Sublime Porte 
intimidated the journalists by suggesting that they would be constantly watched. That 
made the journals concerned to feel bounded by a kind of a contract. The Foreign 
Minister Reshid Pasha first used this technique in 1845 and it gave good results.
217
 
Charles Baron de Venito sent a letter to the Foreign Minister from Germany. In it, de 
Venito expressed his regret regarding the shipment of his subscribed journal, Augnot 
Osterreich. According to his statements, de Venito already notified the First 
Dragoman of the Sublime Porte (Fuad Pasha) of his difficulties, but he also found it 
necessary to inform the person in charge of the assignment, Foreign Minister Rechid 
Pasha. The concerned Augnot Osterreich was requested to be sent by a subscription 
regularly, yet the charges of shipment made them impossible to send them 
periodically. As much as de Venito appreciated the payments from Shekib Pasha, the 
financier of the Sultan, he still expected a way out of his difficult situation. De 
Venito assured the Foreign Minister of his devotion to his duty, adding that his 
political journals always monitored the well-being of the Ottoman Empire. Still he 
presumed that the new directives to come would lead his way more easily.  
Similarly, on August 20, 1857 Amédée de Céséna, the former editor of 
Constitutionnel expressed a wish to the Ottoman representative in Paris, Mehemmed 
Jemil.
218
 De Céséna wrote that he recently started publishing another journal, La 
Semaine Politique et Littéraire de Paris. Ever at the disposal of the Imperial 
Embassy, he was eager to support the interests of the Ottoman Empire as he had in 
                                                        
   217 BOA, HR.TO. ; 142, 406/33. On 30th November 1845. 
   218 BOA, HR.TO. ; 303, 71/69. 
99 
 
Constitutionnel. In exchange for his services, de Céséna asked for an encouragement 
by demanding the underwriting of his new journal. Mehemmed Jemil was aware of 
de Céséna’s reputation as a publicist and, after evaluating the importance of the 
paper, he informed the Foreign Minister, Ali Pasha, of the request. Jemil noted that 
the cost would be only 16 francs for a year and good policies could be easily 
maintained in this way.  
Encouraging journalists through financial assistance sometimes took the form 
of outright hiring. If there was considerable amount of money involved, the 
journalists paid close attention to the policies of the Sublime Porte and were not 
distracted by the promising prices offered by other powers. One such agent of the 
Ottoman Empire was a Mr. Sefels, Paris. Sefels described progress of his assignment 
to the Sublime Porte in a letter dated August 27, 1850.
219
 Referring to a letter by the 
Foreign Ministry dated the 5
th
 of that month, Mr. Sefels wrote many articles for 
several newspapers about the political agenda of the Ottoman Empire. However, 
Sefels described a predicament that concerned an article by another journalist, which 
appeared in Journal des Débats. The journalis, Mr. Ronet, treated the journey (?) of 
His Imperial Majesty Sultan Abdülmecid in a manner that did not reflect reality. Mr. 
Sefels claimed in his report that he corrected the comments of Mr. Ronet on the 
issue. How Sefel did this was not clarified, but it seems he had some power and 
prerogative in his efforts to promote the policies of the Foreign Ministry. Even 
though his duties were drawn strictly by the Ottoman Government, Mr. Sefel had 
enough influence that he could ask for official assistance from the Sublime Porte. He 
believed access to an official would ease his task by sending bulletins on regular 
basis. This official could also guide his work and tell him how to treat common 
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questions concerning the Ottoman Empire. As he had a “sincere desire to make 
himself as useful as possible to the Ottoman Empire”220, Mr. Sefels demanded that 
best guidance possible be provided to him. That correspondence ascertains that the 
public diplomacy carried out by the Foreign Ministry of the Sublime Porte was not 
primitive, but rather engaged an intricate communications network as part of the 19
th
 
century modern foreign policy. 
 
 
4.3. Decoration of Medals 
 
Aside from hiring journalists and editors, or supporting them with regular 
payments, the Sublime Porte used another means to win over individual journalists or 
other agents honoring them with Ottoman medals in return for their favorable 
services. Interestingly enough, many of the agents and journalists hoped for 
decorations rather than money. The Foreign Ministry was aware of this, and so did 
not hesitate to satisfy such expectations. These medals were flattering and the 
contentment they provided returned as a good service.
221
 When money ceased to 
flow, an author’s attitude could shift. In the case of decorations, the effect of the 
eulogy lasted much longer. A letter sent by ambassador Safvet Pasha (1814–1883) 
from Paris to the Foreign Minister Ali Pasha reflects that relationship of indulgence 
by the Sublime Porte toward the journalists.
222
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As reported on December 30, 1865, Safvet Pasha informed the Foreign 
Minister of a request made for receipt of the 3
rd
 class of Medjidie Medal from the 
Sultan. The individuals seeking the decoration had the good manners to not ask 
directly. There was a hierarchy within the intelligence network and requests came to 
the Ottoman authorities through the foreign agents of the Foreign Ministry. In this 
case, Ottoman agent Mr. Rogués223 was the channel for the appeal, and he spoke on 
behalf of Ernest Dréolle, the editor of La Patrie. Mr. Rogués explained that La Patrie 
had long been hostile to the Ottoman Empire. Dréolle was, in contrast, fair in his 
approach to the Ottoman Empire: he was useful and devoted to the interests of the 
Sublime Porte. Dréolle’s position was already recognized with a 4th class Medjidie 
Order. Mr. Rogués made clear that, in their last meeting the editor talked about how 
anxious he was to receive the Order of the 3
rd
 Class. Attributing to himself the 
complete change of attitude of the newspaper toward the Ottoman Empire, Mr. 
Dréolle believed it his right to make such a demand. By adding he would be quite 
satisfied and happy forever, Mr. Dréolle also promoted a favorable approach by his 
newspaper in the future. For these justifications, Mr. Rogués requested his demands 
be met. As La Patrie was one of the largest newspapers in Paris and it had many 
semi-official ties to other publications, Safvet Pasha maintained that it was a chance 
for the Foreign Ministry to endorse good service and good monitoring. It may well 
be that an Imperial Order of Medjidie medal became one of the most effective and 
powerful tools of the Sublime Porte in their campaign to earn the respect and trust of 
foreign journalists and newspapers. That situation also suggests that, in a period 
when speculations were made all over Europe regarding the decline and weakness of 
the Ottoman Empire, there was still a certain number of people who were aware of 
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the real situation, and they continued to esteem the Sultan and to expect to be 
honored with His Majesty’s medals.  
In some cases, there was no need to offer or seek favors. As noted above, 
when the Foreign Ministry found someone who was aware of the real situation of the 
Ottoman Empire and who strove to disseminate that reality abroad, the rewards came 
without petitions. The Duke de Vlini was one such person chosen for the blessing of 
the Ottoman Empire. As indicated in a report
224
 by Kalimaki Beg, the ambassador of 
Paris in 1850, de Vlini was the member of the French Parliament and had in previous 
years served as a clerk in the French Embassy in Istanbul. As he was acquainted with 
life in the Ottoman capital and used to the administrative system in the Ottoman 
Empire, Duke de Vlini was one of the people in France who best knew the situation 
of the Empire. Whatever his network relations with the officials and subjects of the 
Ottoman Empire may have been, it is obvious that relations and his treatment were 
good enough to earn his sympathy. Kalimaki, in his letter, mentioned that he was 
transmitting a copy of a book written by de Vlini, remarking further that it had been 
published in the newspapers. Although the report does not make this clear, the book 
was probably about the Ottoman Empire as the ambassador noted he met with the 
author to discuss some issues in the book. Duke’s favorable activities toward the 
Ottoman Empire, both in the French Parliament and in the press, required a prize in 
return. With that purpose in mind, Kalimaki Beg demanded the Duke be honored 
with a medal and that he be treated well.  
At least twice, the Foreign Ministry was generous toward good assessments 
of its policies and good behavior toward the interests of the Ottoman Empire. 
Besides, if there was any lack of service that far from fulfilling the needs of the 
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public diplomacy the Foreign Ministry aimed at, the agents were not rewarded. The 
chargé d’affaires for the Ottoman Empire based in Brussels, one Mr. Diran 
complained about the latest behavior of M. Biraderi(?), a journalist for 
l’Independence.225 While he had received a medal by Imperial Order, Mr. Diran 
observed that Biraderi was no longer writing articles that were so favorable, and he 
gave up the idea of flattering the journalist. Instead, he advised the Ottoman 
authorities to seek someone else who would be more useful and so worthy of the 
decoration granted by the Sultan.  
As was true for all other administrative mechanisms of the modern 
bureaucratic system, the public diplomacy efforts of the Foreign Ministry at home 
and abroad were maintained through a hierarchy. The representatives of the Ottoman 
Empire in the embassies abroad did not hesitate to make decisions they believed 
would resolve their problems, but the decisions were always implemented with the 
direction and guidance of the Foreign Ministry. Furthermore, each concession 
necessitated a service in return. If a person honored with medals of the Sultan, he 
must work harder or fall from favor.  
 
4.4. Manipulation and Prevention Policies 
 
Within a decade of the installation of the Tazimat reforms, the Foreign 
Ministry of the Sublime Porte had developed an elaborate network system, as a 
report dated July 12, 1861 asserted.
226
 Mr. Vilos, ad interim in charge of the 
functions of the Foreign Ministry in Paris, addressed Ali Pasha about his activities 
with the foreign newspapers, especially l’Opinion Nationale, concerning the 
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accession of the new Sultan Abdulaziz Han (r. 1861–1876). Vilos was grateful to 
hear that the Sublime Porte would appoint an employee to be responsible for sending 
detailed correspondence to the various embassies regarding current issues in the 
capital and provinces of the Empire. In this way, it would be easier to supply 
newspapers with numerous items of interesting and reliable information.  
After expressing his gratitude to the Sublime Porte, Mr. Vilos assessed the 
attitude of l’Opinion Nationale. Mr. Chauvenel was previously in charge of the 
position Mr. Vilos now held. During his tenure, Mr. Chauvenel had diplomatic 
intimacy with Count Persigney[?] of London and had the latter’s cooperation 
regarding protection of the Empire’s interest in foreign newspapers. Vilos continued, 
noting that the journal already attracted the attention of the Ottoman Government 
with a few items it had published. In one of his dispatches attached to the Vilos 
report, Mr. Chauvenel informed the Foreign Ministry of initiatives taken by Count 
Persigney to influence the policy of l’Opinion Nationale to favor the Ottoman 
Empire. Thus, the Count had also the attention of the Minister of the Interior and, in 
that way, desired to strengthen the diplomatic relations between the Sublime Porte 
and the British Government. Persigney also made strong comments to the editor of 
the newspaper, and pledged to bring more consideration of Turkish affairs to him, to 
ensure that his writing would draw more attention in the future observations of the 
Ottoman Empire.  
Promises such as those made by Vilos were never ignored by the Foreign 
Ministry of the Sublime Porte. At the right moment, came, Ottoman officials were 
reminded of the duties of their agents. In the case of l’Opinion Nationale, the 
opportunity arose with the accession of Sultan Abdülaziz Han. Mr. Vilos announced 
his pleasure at receiving from the Grand Vizier a copy and translation of the Imperial 
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Decree (Hatt-ı Hümayun) of the Sultan concerning his accession and the future of his 
realm. In return, Mr. Vilos conversed with Mr. Guerolt about the issue as Count 
Persigney had before. He first asked the editor of this and other journals to insert the 
copy of the new Imperial Decree into their publication. Then, Mr. Vilos assured the 
editor that the earlier reforms of Sultan Abdülmecid (r. 1839–1861) would be 
continued by the new Sultan more vigorously than they had in the past. He showed 
the example of Guerolt, a journalist who changed French opinion about the Ottoman 
Empire to a considerable degree. Mr. Vilos further suggested that, if His Highness 
the Sultan managed to keep his promises and prove that he was really keen on 
introducing innovations, public opinion in Europe would grow daily rather than 
weaken. Therefore, the cooperation between the Sublime Porte and its agents and 
representatives proved that the authorities were not issuing unilateral orders and then 
waiting for them to be executed. There was an intricate system of cooperation among 
the agents of the Ottoman Empire, the journalists and the Ottoman authorities. 
Moreover, the agents standing at the active side of the intelligence network had 
greater opportunities to closely observe the atmosphere and attitudes toward the 
Ottoman Empire in Europe. For this reason, they had more advice to offer the 
Sublime Porte than the idea of a robotic taking of orders suggests.  
While maintaining its public diplomacy schemes, the Sublime Porte and its 
representatives abroad were always careful not to upset the honor of the agents or 
journalists they hired. Abdolynme Ubicini (1818–1884) was a French historian and 
journalist, famous for his outstanding study on the Ottoman Empire, Lettres sur La 
Turquie (1853). He received a share of the public largess from the Ottoman Empire 
and had to keep his writing within certain limits, as evident from the report to Rıza 
Efendi. Rıza  Efendi informed the Foreign Ministry in 1851 that Mr. Ubicini had 
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inserted an article on Aleppo, as Rıza had instigated, into l’Revue d’Orient, a journal 
Ubicini himself had founded.
227
 Nevertheless, the French journalist gave the 
impression that he was not content with his position, and the need to play according 
to the rules of the Sublime Porte.  
Successful public diplomacy required strategic planning for communication 
rather than mere suppression and intimidation. Rıza Efendi was a reasonable 
agreeing on the point that some policies should be carried out on mutual basis for the 
benefit of both sides. He took the liberty to add a letter from Ubicini to the journal to 
solve the problem of his distress. In the letter, Ubicini claimed authorship of the 
article, implying that could restrain him to write from the way he did. Thus Rıza 
Efendi granted to Ubicini the merit that famous journalist deserved. Using a 
conciliatory manner, he both won Ubicini’s confidence and oversaw the interest of 
the Ottoman Empire. As also happened with many of the European powers, the 
Ottoman Empire developed an elaborate foreign policy. The officials of the Sublime 
Porte incorporated the Ottoman Empire into European state system by playing the 
rules of the international public diplomacy and pleasing the both sides.  
Diplomatic correspondence and dialogue did not always work to the benefit 
of the Ottoman Empire. Sometimes money and intimidation were not enough to 
divert the principles of the journalists; sometimes a hostile attitude was part of a 
campaign by other European powers that the Foreign Ministry could not handle 
easily. In such circumstances, the Ottoman Empire was merciless toward foreign 
newspapers. In such cases, the Ottoman authorities relied on censorship or 
prevention diplomacies, forbidding the import of the newspapers into Ottoman lands 
and border provinces. On November 3, 1847 the Ottoman representative Constantin 
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Seraphius sent a report from Tuscany asking for orders from the Porte without delay 
in order to punish Mr. Chiellini for his disobedience.
228
 Mr. Chiellini was the editor 
of the journal Giurisprudenza Bisontina and, for the reasons not made clear, he was 
forbidden to distribute the journal. In the defiance of the orders of the Ottoman 
Legation in Tuscany, Chiellini did not suspend publication. The result of the conflict 
was not stated in the document. Perhaps it was solved through the efforts of the 
Ottoman officials in Tuscany or perhaps the problem was debated in the higher 
echelons of the Foreign Ministry. However, it is clear that the first step for 
representatives of the Empire abroad was to use their own network to resolve any 
kind of crisis. If this was unsuccessful, the Foreign Ministry, as center of the 
Ottoman foreign policy, took the case in its own hands.  
At the behest of the Sublime Porte, Ottoman officials in Europe occasionally 
attempted to involve the governments of the countries in which the newspapers were 
published. This was a part of the overall strategy of defensive diplomacy. 
Intercession by European officials in the attitudes of the foreign newspapers totally 
secured the position of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, that kind of public 
diplomacy became a good excuse for Ottoman diplomats and their European 
counterparts to form a modern diplomatic relationship. The peaceful effect of 
censorship and prevention is best seen in the relationship with Austria-Hungary in 
the second half of the 19
th
 century. In a letter dated May 6, 1869 the Austrian 
Legation was notified of a response to the Sublime Porte via Translation Office 
regarding two Austrian newspapers (Imera and Felyo); they would not be delivered 
to the provinces of the Ottoman Empire.
229
 Until this order changed, the Austrian 
Postal Administration would suspend circulation of these publications. Despite the 
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clarity of the message, there was also ambiguity regarding why Austria was willing 
to protect the Empire. In the alliance of the Ottoman Empire with Austria regarding 
the policies toward foreign newspapers, the Prime Minister of Austria, Count 
Andrassy, acted as the guardian of the Empire in 1870s. During his tenure, Andrassy 
developed a relationship with Germany that counteracted the power of Russia. His 
defense of the integrity of the Empire was a part of that strategy; too, as Andrassy 
feared that a reversal would result in considerable weight in favor of Russia and Slav 
Powers in Germany.
230
 The first report from Vienna, in 1873, was addressed to the 
Foreign Minister Khalil Sherif Pasha (1872–73).231 As informed by Perschof Efendi 
(?), the Ottoman representative Arif Beg described the newspaper Chezernagratz. A 
weekly journal published in Chetinje, Austria-Hungarian authorities prohibited its 
entrance into the Dalmatian region. Perschof Efendi consulted with Count Andrassy, 
who confirmed that prohibition was necessary owing to the seditious and subversive 
language of the newspaper. Count Andrassy sincerely hoped that, for the good of the 
Ottoman Empire, the newspaper would not be available in the neighboring provinces 
either. Although the content of the articles was not recounted in the report, this 
indicates a sense of menace against the Ottoman Empire. Thus, retaining a peaceful 
policy with the Sublime Porte, Count Andrassy considered it necessary to warn the 
Ottoman authorities. 
The second report was sent from Vienna as particular and confidential by 
Caloux to Foreign Minister Mehmed Rachid Pasha (1873–74; 1875–76).232 Dated 
December 11, 1869, the report discussed a request to Count Andrassy by the Sublime 
Porte that the director of Osservateur Triestino be removed. The incident took place 
                                                        
   230 “Gyula, Count Andrassy.” Encyclopedia Britannica. Encyclopedia Britannica Online Academic 
Edition. Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 2012. Web. 16 Aug. 2012.  
   231 BOA, HR.TO. ; 1465, 107/81. Dated on March 6, 1873. 
   232 BOA, HR.TO. ; 1465, 107/103. 
109 
 
as follows. The Department of Interior of the Austrian Government sent to the 
Government of Trieste a strongly-worded note: The Austrian Government blamed 
the newspaper for its lack of oversight and was unable to understand how such 
articles hostile to a friend and ally of the Austria-Hungarian Government could be 
published in an official newspaper. It is likely that the agent and proponent of the 
Austrian Government and mediator between the two sides, Mr. Caloux, wanted to 
draw the attention of the Ottoman authorities to the sentiments that drove the 
Austria-Hungarian Government towards the Sublime Porte. Unlike conventional 
assumptions that associate the 19
th
 century Ottoman Empire with weakness, an 
Empire in need of Europe, the documents refute such an image. It was not only that 
the Ottoman Empire needed the tools of public diplomacy to be part of the European 
system. In most cases the European powers themselves also saw the necessity to 
apply the same methods in order to obtain the support of the Ottoman Empire.  
However, when the Foreign Ministry exceeded the limits of its prevention 
policies, the aggrieved side was able to adjust the situation. On occasion, the editors 
of the newspapers that were suspended or censored were obstinately opposed to 
following the directives. Before waiting for the worst to come, they challenged the 
Ottoman authorities via diplomatic correspondence. So, on November 29, 1857 
Balgot Begne sent a letter to the Sublime Porte that attempted to make his position 
clear.
233
 As the editor of the newspaper Press d’Orient, Begne complained about the 
censor imposed by the Sublime Porte. In place of direct conflicts with the Ottoman 
authorities, Begne chose to defend his cause. He found the censorship of the article 
unjust, since the sentence given to the censor was a translation taken from the 
Observatore Triestino. Moreover, there had not been enough time to check each line 
                                                        
   233 BOA, HR.TO. ; 312, 428/20. 
110 
 
of the newspaper as other formalities already occupied all their time. Begne wrote of 
the difficulty of working with the news that was sent Trieste. His employees had to 
line the strips for hours, translate the news, write the articles, composing and 
checking the type, all of which took several hours to complete. For that reason, he 
argued, it was impossible to find a censor in time as they had to rush new arrivals for 
the coming days. Whenever a French boat was sent to ship the newspapers, they 
waited for 2 days for its return. It would not be possible to provide new summaries if 
he spent so much time on censorship. At the end of his report, Balgot Begne gave an 
implicit warning to the Sublime Porte. He maintained that if the Ottoman authorities 
insisted on that attitude toward censorship, his response would be a total silence. As 
it is seen, public diplomacy in the 19
th
 century was not always to the advantage of the 
big powers. From time to time, smaller actors within the system also stood against 
unjust and immoderate threats coming from above. 
Other small actors on the 19
th
 century international diplomacy scene 
occasionally abandoned the diplomatic protocols and fought for their own interests. 
Zaffan Hanly, the director of Levant Time & Shipping Gazette, was one who used 
every means possible to save his newspaper from the clutches of the Ottoman 
Empire. In 1874, during the brief Grand Vizierate of Hussein Avni Pasha, Hanly 
became a victim of the Grand Vizier and his newspaper had to halt publication. Once 
the tenure of Serasker Hussein Avni Pasha ended, Hanly reclaimed his rights to 
publish. He sent a letter on October 25, 1875 demanding from Grand Vizier 
Mahmoud Nedim Pasha (1875–1876) and Sultan Abdülaziz (1861–1876) that justice 
be rendered to him.
234
 Hanly claimed that the reasons for his harassment by Hussein 
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Avni Pasha were entirely personal, and that they caused his ruin. He described the 
course of events in a way that did not permit argument.  
As he describes it, on August 9, 1874 the Office of the Press of the Imperial 
Government had issued a decree blaming Hanly for the false impressions the articles 
contained. The Sublime Porte asserted that the offending news was produced by one 
financial institution and this was not made clear in the report. The impression was 
counter to the interests of the Ottoman Empire and its officials considered the 
accusations without foundation. As the Imperial Government could not tolerate such 
strong language, Levant Times & Shipping Gazette was stopped publishing from that 
day onwards. The decree, conveyed by the Dragoman of the Imperial Divan under a 
special order of Hussein Avni Pasha, was not based on any article of the Law of 
Press ratified in 1864 by the Sublime Porte. According to the 9
th
 article of that law; 
the kind of materials published in foreign countries would be forbidden to enter to 
the Ottoman land and to be distributed within if they had the contents threatening the 
well-being of the Ottoman Empire.
235
 There was no inscription claiming the 
prevention of the publication. Thus, Hanly was smart enough to circumvent the 
Sublime Porte by exploiting the deficiencies in its laws. He also did not exclude 
agitation as a means to justify his motives. Hussein Avni Pasha charged the editor 
with a criminal offense and clarified the duties of Hanly. The editor argued that he 
had fully complied with the conditions imposed by the Grand Vizier but still his 
newspaper was shut down. For that reason, he suffered serious financial damage. The 
publishing industry abandoned him and his mental anguish exacerbated that 
situation. Having no hope of change for his situation as long as Hussein Avni Pasha 
was in power, Hanly waited until another person became Grand Vizier. He first 
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presented his complaint to the Minister of Justice and to the President of the State 
Council but they were unwilling to take on the cause: each alleged that the case was 
not within their jurisdiction. Then, Hanly appealed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Safvet Pasha. It seems that Safvet Pasha was of no help and Hanly transmitted the 
appeal to the Grand Vizier Mahmoud Nedim Pasha, hoping that his case would be 
brought to the Sultan. Throughout the episode, the editor Zaffan Hanly, saw it his 
natural right to pursue his case and he demanded 10,000 pounds sterling to cover the 
damages to his newspaper. That report does not indicate how that case was resolved. 
However, as there was nothing negative attached in the end of the report by the 
Ottoman authorities, it is likely that it was the outcome favored Hanly. Believing that 
the problem stemmed from personal hostility, the editor claimed that he had done his 
best to comply with orders, and he hoped the Sublime Porte would evaluate the crisis 
as justifiable and would cause no more pain to the desperate Zaffan Hanly. 
The Foreign Ministry of the Sublime Porte was not always merciful in its 
public diplomacy. Accusations and attacks about the internal administration systems 
and about minority groups were always vulnerable points for the Empire. As issues 
that were not open to discussion, the Sublime Porte took harsh measures without 
chance for reconciliation, when such attacks came. During the second half of the 19
th
 
century the rights of the Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire became the 
means through which European powers expressed their wishes regarding the Empire. 
Even though the edict of 1856 granted non-Muslim populations equal rights to their 
Muslim counterparts, the process of carrying out reforms became a toy in 
international politics. Russia was most successful in its exploitation of the religious 
minority problem, as the Orthodoxy was a main tool to entice the Slavic peoples in 
the Balkans. In that case, the correspondence on various news items coming to the 
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Translation Office on these issues gives interesting clues of the public diplomacy 
Foreign Ministry employed. A newspaper that serves as a model for this kind of 
situation was Suctovide, published in Belgrade. An informative letter about that 
newspaper was sent on April 11, 1865 at the request of an unanimous Ottoman 
official.
236
  
A correspondent of Suctovide published an article in Moscow under the 
headline of “Russia and Turkey.” In the article, the author advised Russia to make 
preparations concerning the Eastern Question
237
 and to solve it in accordance with its 
own interest. The language of the article was provocative and aimed at activating the 
religious fervor of the Russian Government. The journalist suggested that Russia was 
ready to shed its blood and sacrifice its entire fortune to emancipate its co-
religionists.
238
 He argued that though the conflict between Russia and the Ottoman 
Empire gave Serbia, Romania and Greece new life there were still millions of 
Christians groaning with pain despite the treaties made by the Empire. Moreover, the 
friendly policy of Russia toward the Sublime Porte with regard to Egypt, Candia and 
Epirus of Bulgarians manifested no happy results. For these reasons, he thought that 
it was in the interest of Russia to assist the emancipation of Slavs in the Ottoman 
Empire. The author blamed Britain for its hypocritical attitude, claiming that if it was 
not for the business policies of the merchants, the British Government would not 
strive to safeguard the welfare and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The 
correspondent added that the domination of the clergy was an obstacle to the 
development of national life and political progress of the Slavs of Turkey. He argued 
that, for many years, the Slavs made efforts to establish an independent national 
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church of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Since Britain did not give any thought 
to the situation of the Slavs, it was the duty of Russia to defend the rights of his co-
religionists. Among the rash challenges of the correspondent was a proposal that 
Russian conquest of the Caucasus would be another solution for the Eastern 
Question.  
These remarks and proposals were direct threats to Ottoman sovereignty. In 
these occasions, the Sublime Porte was reluctant to step back and reconcile. The 
accusations were not acceptable and, as the center of foreign policy, the Foreign 
Ministry had to act as the decision-maker in accordance with the regulations of the 
modern diplomacy. The Ottoman representative warned the authorities that this was 
the language of people who were determined to harm the peaceful atmosphere of the 
Empire. He requested that the Foreign Minister address the subject and prohibit the 
introduction of these malicious sheets into the provinces. Fearing that the precautions 
against this kind of menace would not be sufficient, he also proposed that the 
Ottoman Board of Press inform opinion in France of these intrigues of Slavic 
propaganda. As early as the 1840s, when the Ottoman representative sent his report 
from Paris to Reshid Pasha
239
 assessing the hostility of the French press against the 
Ottoman Empire, the Foreign Ministry used the French press as its main example to 
carry out public diplomacy abroad. The first Law of Press in 1864 was even 
translated after the example of the 1852 French Press Law.
240
 On those grounds, the 
public opinion in French newspaper as an ally power was a helpful tool for foreign 
diplomacy. 
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4.5. Legal Actions 
 
While conducting public diplomacy, the Foreign Ministry of the Sublime 
Porte and its representatives abroad did not fail to search for gaps in the legal system 
of the countries that might permit damage to the image of the Ottoman Empire 
through publishing. Using their legal rights against enemies was one of the most 
effective weapons that the Foreign Ministry employed. In this way, Ottoman 
authorities could send a message to their rivals and allies alike, that they had an 
elaborate intelligence network through which they obtained knowledge of everything 
occupying the international political agenda and law system. Furthermore, it also 
asserted their ability to pursue modern public diplomacy. The easiest means to carry 
out legal action against foreign newspapers was through the Press Law (Matbuat 
Nizamnamesi) of the foreign countries in which these newspapers were published. 
For instance on November 3, 1865 the Viennese newspaper Nationale was reported 
to have included malicious writings about His Imperial Majesty Sultan Abdülaziz.241 
The Governor of Bosnia and the Ottoman delegate in Ragusa both complained. The 
Ottoman delegate assured the Porte that he had already taken precautions according 
to the Press Law of Vienna before informing the authorities. 
Other cases required more careful attention while searching for appropriate 
legal action. For example, the Ottoman Imperial Legation in Athens sent a 
correspondence to the Sublime Porte on January 26, 1857 addressed to the Foreign 
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Minister Ethem Pasha (1818–1893).242 The author of the letter, Khalil, complained 
about an attack on the Imperial Government, the courts of the Ottoman Empire and 
the legal case of Salih Pasha (1813–1861) made by the Greek newspaper 
l’Espérance. The main argument and attack concerned the acquittal of Salih Pasha, 
and his being found innocent by the courts. The crisis apparently developed around 
the prosecution of Salih Pasha but nothing was made clear in the report about the 
legal case. The Ottoman representative Khalil waged a war of wits against the editor 
of l’Espérance, based on the certain acts of Hellenic Penal Law. Article 10 and 13 
gave the necessary rationale to the Ottoman authorities to act against accusatory 
publications. Nevertheless, Hellenic Penal Law also contained tricky passages that 
forced the representative to think twice before acting. On the surface, both of these 
articles permitted the Foreign Ministry to take legal steps easily. In Article 10 of that 
law it was written that “the one who insults any rulers of foreign countries by words 
or writing or a symbolic representation is punished by imprisonment of six months to 
two years.”243 Article 13 stated that “he who insults governments or authorities in 
Foreign Countries, in interviews published or in writing delivered to the advertising 
of symbolic representations or, by mocking blasphemy and defamatory of any kind 
or, causing by the same means, the inhabitants to revolt from Foreign Countries is 
punished by imprisonment up to six months.”244  
In that regard, everything seems to favor the Sublime Porte. The Ottoman 
officials did not have to work hard to resolve the problem; the crisis could be 
transferred easily to the courts of the Hellenic Government. However, Hellenic 
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authorities did not fail to observe to Khalil that their law system was not that open to 
manipulation, and that there were indications making the process more complicated. 
According to its authorities, the Hellenic Penal Law also related that, in the case of a 
complaint made by the representative of the country insulted, the same rights were 
granted to the representatives of Greece regarding that foreign country. Even though 
a law system of a country should not address the legal system in other countries, the 
Greek Government was not so foolish as to give concessions to foreign powers 
without earning some benefits in return. The Ottoman representative was surprised 
by this ruling, and he had to give up his complaint. Instead, he requested that the 
Foreign Minister Ethem Pasha act again in accordance with Article 13, which also 
stated that in the case of the Greek representatives a criminal prosecution could not 
take place without a formal denunciation on the part of the offense. Khalil added that 
Salih Pasha also had the right, by virtue of the same article, to submit a complaint to 
the Hellenic Legation in Constantinople through the office of the Imperial Minister 
of the Foreign Affairs. Even when the Ottoman authorities found themselves in a 
difficult position with no way out, as in the case of Khalil, they generated policies to 
turn the situation to the advantage of the Ottoman Empire. Through the methods of 
public diplomacy, each division of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry functioned in 
compliance with one another. 
The power of the press in some cases became self-destructive and then the 
Foreign Ministry discreetly used it to channel excuses for legal actions. As 
mentioned many time before, if there was a menace to the security of Ottoman 
integrity the response could be severe. The late 1850s and 1860s was a period of 
general discontent and uprising in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The region was one of the 
last holdouts against the tax farming reforms imposed by the Ottoman 
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administration. Wealthy landowners both rejected their share of the tax to the 
Ottoman Government and did not consent to any concessions given to Christian 
minorities. At the same time, the peasant population suffered much because of the 
oppressions of the landowners. Nevertheless, only the Christian populations attracted 
the attention and benefits of the European powers and, as result there were frequent 
uprisings. Between 1871 and 1876, the Ottoman government attempted further 
reforms, based on the 1864 Vilayet Provincial System. It was of no help and in the 
end, foreign agitation on behalf of the Christian peasants created riots against the 
landlords of Herzegovina.
245
  
On the eve of the hot debates over that international crisis, the Ottoman 
ambassador to London Constantin Musurus (1807–1891) sent a report to the Foreign 
Minister Safvet Pasha.
246
 His letter called the attention of the Foreign Minister to the 
provoking activities of a former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of London, 
Lord Russell (1792–1878). Musurus claimed that, on the issue of Herzegovina, the 
English press generally remained favorable toward the Ottoman Empire. 
Nonetheless, he argued that in recent days the language of the English newspaper  
The Times of London had to be amended. His reason was that the newspaper 
supported the idea of making certain administrative concessions to the insurgents 
without any means of their pacification. This idea was mainly that of Lord Russell, 
who declared himself ready to offer 50 pounds in favor of the insurgents against the 
misrule of the Ottoman Empire. Russell was also eager to organize a meeting 
concerning the fate of Herzegovina. 
Apparently the attitude of Lord Russell surprised the political world and he 
became the target of harsh criticisms. The aim of Musurus was to transmit that 
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criticism exactly to the Sublime Porte so that the Ottoman officials could maintain 
their public diplomacy much more efficiently. During the Tanzimat Period, there 
were dozens of news items published in foreign newspapers that argued against the 
welfare of the Ottoman Empire. The Foreign Ministry closely analyzed only those 
which provided an opportunity for defense and exploitation of the Ottoman Empire 
and which could became the tools of Ottoman public diplomacy. In the case of Lord 
Russell, three outstanding newspapers of Britain, The Morning Post, The Daily 
Telegraph and The Pall Mall Gazette took the side of the Ottoman Empire. The 
agents of the Sublime Porte abroad, who did their best to find leaks on their behalf, 
used these newspapers as instruments of propaganda to counter the hostility of 
Times. Lord Russell had written many years ago about attending a meeting, at Lord 
Fitzwilliams in Grosvenor Square, in support of the Greek insurgents and there too 
he subscribed 50 pounds to their cause.
247
 As a response to the statement of Lord 
Russell, The Morning Post accused him of not having “much character for wisdom to 
lose” and also claimed that his “mania for letter-writing appeared to be incurable.”248 
The newspaper argued that the issue of Herzegovina required the most delicate 
conduct and could only be treated at the discretion of the high Ottoman authorities. 
The next day, the Morning Post published a note written by someone named Hassan. 
While his nationality was not indicated in the letter, his name suggests that he was 
either the subject of the Ottoman Empire probably residing in Herzegovina or he was 
otherwise of Arab origin. His note stated: 
I remember many years ago insurrections against the British misrule in India 
and Ireland. I did not subscribe on behalf of them, I did not think it right. Earl 
Russell  convinced me that I was mistaken. It is too early for a meeting in 
Constantinople. But I give notice that whenever there is another insurrection 
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against British misrule I will  subscribe 50 pounds on behalf of the insurgents. 
Your obedient servant.
 249
 
 
The letter from Hassan assured the Ottoman officials that they could vanquish the 
propaganda of Lord Russell with another propaganda weapon that would cause much 
suffering to the British Government. Further pain was borne by Lord Russell, when 
he became the target of his government’s fury as well as that of the Ottoman Empire. 
 Musurus also claimed that ThePall Mall Gazette offered a more certain 
solution to Russell’s provocation. According to the opinion of the great English 
jurists Lord Russell’s subscription, against a friendly power and in favor of the 
insurgents, was an offense for which he could be prosecuted. Having found an 
opportunity to use British Law to their advantage, the Sublime Porte became be more 
interested in the second way to resolve the problem of Lord Russell’s provocative 
statements.  
 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
Public diplomacy, the interaction between the Ottoman Empire and foreign 
powers to establish a mutual dialogue to inform and influence, became the main tool 
of Ottoman foreign policy in the 19
th
 century. The Ottoman Empire was no longer a 
super power, and the changing face of the administrative systems in Europe also had 
an effect on the Empire. Along with the internal problems caused by external factors, 
the emergence of the modern state system in Europe compelled the Sublime Porte to 
assert its position in the international arena. Its policies were carried out through the 
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rules of diplomacy. In becoming acquainted with diplomatic means of 
communication, the Ottoman Empire also became acquainted with the significance 
of public diplomacy. 
 The ill-intentioned desires of Europe regarding the Ottoman Empire 
encouraged certain European organs to use such modern means as provocation, 
defamation and attrition campaigns. The best way to accomplish their policy goals 
was through the use of newspapers. As the main tool of propaganda, European 
newspapers campaigned vigorously against the interests of the Ottoman Empire. 
Accordingly, capturing the public opinion through the press was not a simple 
question of recognition; it was also necessary to protect the image of the Empire.
250
 
The Foreign Ministry of the Sublime Porte, the heart of the Ottoman foreign 
diplomacy, and the newly formed bureaucratic class working there were conscious of 
this need, and learned to make provisions for these malicious weapons. The Foreign 
Ministry used the tools of public diplomacy to control and manipulate the flow of 
intelligence within and to foreign newspapers. Adopting the strategies of persuasion, 
financial aid, and distribution of medals, prevention and legal action, the Ottoman 
officials proved the capability of its intelligence network along with the well-
organized and complex structure of its bureaucracy. 
 While the Foreign Ministry of the Sublime Porte was at the core of that public 
diplomacy, the embassy agents in Europe and Translation Office in Istanbul became 
its main channels to promote the flow of information and ease the way for their 
bureaucratic transactions.  The Translation Office of the Sublime Porte was the first 
training center of foreign diplomacy and “the seedbed of the Tanzimat elite”251 
whereas the Ottoman embassies were the locations where the officials of the 
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Translation Office gained experience in the field. As a last stop Foreign Ministry 
became the place for the seniors and decision-makers of all these sub-sections 
following their order.  In that way, the public diplomacy of the 19
th
 century Ottoman 
Empire was established around these three important axis of the Ottoman 
bureaucracy. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Starting with the end of the 17
th
 century, the Ottoman administrators realized 
the changing nature of international relations. With the Westphalia Treaty of 1648, 
European powers adopted a new style of international diplomacy based on the 
conference system where the meetings were held on multilateral ways. The Ottoman 
Empire did not feel the urgency to adopt the new diplomacy in Europe until the 
Karlowitz Treaty in 1699, which was the first in a series of events to change the 
Ottoman conduct of diplomacy. Since then, the Ottoman administration concentrated 
on a transformation mainly focused on the enhancement of the bureaucracy and the 
development of Ottoman diplomatic relations.  
Kalemiyye class, grew out of the office of Reis-ül Küttab especially in the 18th 
century, became the pioneer of the reforms initiated during the Tanzimat Reform 
Period (1839–1876).  Though they were implemented mainly to solve the inner 
problems of the Empire, reforms in Ottoman bureaucratic system became a good 
opportunity to integrate Ottoman diplomacy with Europe. Foreign Ministry of the 
Sublime Porte, founded in 1836, was the place where the policies concerning the 
foreign diplomacy were generated and applied. The intelligence network established 
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between the Ottoman embassies in Europe, the Translation Office and the Foreign 
Ministry provided the flow of information necessary for the conduct of public 
diplomacy. 
As the content of the archival correspondences kept in the Translation Office 
demonstrate, the Ottoman Empire in the 19
th
 century was a close observer of daily 
political and social agenda in different European countries. However, a century 
earlier, there was not even a permanent embassy establishment in any major 
European capital and the Ottoman authorities had to rely on irregular reports coming 
from temporary visits of Ottoman officials to Europe. Though the Sefaretnames 
became more or less the first-hand sources reliable in the way that they usually 
include observations in detail, that infrequent circulation of knowledge could not be 
comparable to the stable and systematic information flow provided by the 19
th
 
century bureaucratic system, especially of, Foreign Ministry. 
The influence of the public opinion via the newspapers was one of the most 
effective tools of the 19
th
 century foreign diplomacy. The public diplomacy with the 
use of foreign newspapers in that respect prepared the best way for the Ottoman 
bureaucrats to form an international sphere where they could affect the public 
opinion in Europe directly. The circulation of knowledge channeled around the axis 
of the Ottoman embassies, the Translation Office and the Foreign Ministry was the 
most important communication network. By following and monitoring the political 
agenda and daily occasions happening in Europe through the foreign newspapers, the 
Ottoman Empire became fully equipped with the knowledge concerning different 
aspects of countries in Europe that they were observing. That flow of information 
predominantly helped the promotion of Ottoman foreign diplomacy and its 
implementation abroad. 
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The substantial bureaucratic transformation undertaken within the body of 
Sublime Porte resulted in an elaborate state administration that embellished with the 
modern organizational apparatus effective both inside and abroad. Especially the 
Translation Office as a sub-division and training center of future bureaucrats was the 
exemplar of how the Ottoman state attuned itself to European diplomacy. The 
embassy correspondences addressed to the Foreign Ministry firstly came to the 
Translation Office because they were mainly written in French, which became the 
lingua franca of the 19
th
 century international politics.  
On the other hand, following the internal reforms, the Ottoman Empire was 
also well aware and conscious of the political trends prevalent in the 19
th
 century 
Europe. One of these trends was the public opinion. The Ottoman officials realized 
the importance of public opinion immediately after its popularization in Europe. 
Beyond that, the Ottoman bureaucrats controlled the pulse of the public opinion in 
Europe as part of its public diplomacy through the manipulation of the foreign 
newspapers. In that respect, this study also emphasized the importance of the public 
diplomacy as a modern tool of foreign policy which the Ottoman bureaucrats 
adopted.  
This study demonstrated the transformation of Ottoman foreign diplomacy by 
looking at the conduct of public diplomacy. I wanted to show how Ottoman 
bureaucrats of the Tanzimat period were able to adapt themselves to the new 
requirements of international politics in Europe. In the second chapter, I displayed 
the development of the foreign politics of the Ottoman Empire by correlating it to the 
transformation from the office of Reis-ül Küttab to the Foreign Ministry of 19th 
century Sublime Porte. I also showed the importance of the public diplomacy within 
the framework of foreign politics by relating it to the transformation of Foreign 
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Ministry.  The third and fourth chapters analyze Ottoman’s conduct of public 
diplomacy. As seen clearly from the archival documents, foreign newspapers became 
instrumental of the 19 century public diplomacy. These bureaucrats at the first step 
observed and monitored the major European powers France, England, Austria and 
Russia. The political and social events in these countries were important for the 
Ottoman Empire because of its intense relations with these powers. They monitored 
the pulse of the socio-political conditions of these European countries by supplying a 
steady flow of information from press to the Sublime Porte. With the high 
qualifications in western languages, especially French, the Ottoman bureaucrats 
accomplished the conduct of public diplomacy propitiously as the archival 
documents of the Translation Office clearly demonstrate. 
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